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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Problem of Armed Conflicts and Small Arms in West Africa 
Civil wars in Africa over the last decades are characterised by tremendous 
human suffering, huge losses of civilian lives and have caused huge waves of 
migration across the continent. West Africa is no exception. Over the last decades, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal and Côte d`Ivoire 
have all been ravaged by armed conflicts or civil wars. The roots of all these conflicts 
are a complicated issue. Adedeji has stated that the real reason for the security crisis is 
Africa’s political crisis: “Civil wars and civil strifes are but violent reactions to the 
pervasive lack of democracy, the denial of human rights, the complete disregard of the 
sovereignty of the people, the lack of empowerment of the people, accountability and, 
generally, bad governance.”1 In order to comprehend the multitude of actors and levels 
in these conflicts we need to see them not only as national affairs but as regional 
concerns. African conflicts are rarely confined to one single country even though they 
are mainly civil wars.  They almost indiscriminately become regionalised.2  
There are no wars, within or between states, in which armed personnel represent 
the majority of casualties.3 The civilian population suffers the greatest number of 
casualties. The people of West Africa have seen some of the most bloody and cruel 
acts of war in modern times. Heartbreaking stories from Sierra Leone of mutilations of 
thousands of civilians, and of child soldiers forced to kill their own families have been 
reported through the media and human rights organisations. 
The subject of this study is one of the main issues in these conflicts, i.e. the 
presence of huge amounts of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW). In order to 
obtain peace and stability in West Africa, the huge amounts of weapons must be dealt 
with. “Internal and smaller regional conflicts are often triggered and prolonged by 
ready access to small arms and light weapons. These weapons also fuel crime and 
violence, displace civilians and undermine humanitarian assistance. […] in many 
regions of the world small arms and light weapons constitute a serious threat to peace, 
                                                 
1 Adedeji, Adebayo (1999) 
2 Bøås, Morten (2005b) 
3 Sommerfeldt, Atle (2005) 
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reconciliation, safety, security and sustainable development.”4 Regional insecurity and 
warfare are not caused by the presence of small arms but, as stated by the UK’s 
Department of International Development, “Although SALW are rarely the root cause 
of conflict, crime or insecurity, their wide availability acts as a ‘multiplier of violence’, 
making conflict more lethal, crime more violent and people’s lives, assets and 
livelihoods more insecure.”5  
In West Africa, the Mano River Basin (comprising Guinea, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and by extension Côte d`Ivoire) has become an especially attractive 
marketplace for illicit weapons trade.6 The region has rich resources of diamonds, 
rubber and timber, which are used for purchasing the weapons used in insurgencies 
and wars. Experts have estimated that during the civil war in Liberia, 350 million 
dollars worth of diamonds were spent every year to fuel the war.7  But not only states 
inflicted with civil wars have felt the effects of the proliferation of small arms. 
Through smuggling and huge migrations, neighbouring states and other countries 
across the continent have seen an upsurge in gun-related crimes.8 As a West African 
neighbour to several conflicts, Ghana has seen a remarkable growth in gun-related 
crimes over the last years. The proliferation of weapons and the outbreak of political 
violence are doing great damage to economic development in West Africa. Côte 
d’Ivoire is one country that lately has experienced severely damaging effects on 
economic activity caused by the outbreak of civil war. Millions of SALW in West 
Africa are available, affordable and easy to maintain, conceal, smuggle and use. They 
have prompted ordinary citizens and self-styled freedom fighters to try to solve their 
problems and achieve their goals by violent means. Small arms and light weapons are 
a major destabilising factor. Their proliferation will spark and prolong conflicts, hinder 
relief programmes, undermine peace initiatives and even in times of peace, create a 
general growth in violent crimes. Traditionally, the main focus of the media has been 
on weapons of mass destruction but over the last decade the discourses concerned with 
                                                 
4 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), p.19 
5 UK Department of International Development (2003), p.8. For a comprehensive presentation of the Small 
Arms problem and its costs, see Jackson, T., N. Marsh, T. Owen and A. Thurin (2005) 
6 Bah, Alhaji (2004) 
7 Fung, Ivor Richard and Kouyatè, Lansana (2000) 
8 Bah, Alhaji (2004), p.34 
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SALW have grown stronger. But unlike ABC weapons there are no legally binding 
international treaties for dealing with SALW. 
 
1.2 Research Question and its Background 
1.2.1 The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
The President of Mali presented the idea of a West African small arms 
moratorium9 in 1993. The idea was welcomed among others by ECOWAS, OAU 
(Organisation of African Unity, now the African Union) and the UN. After some 
consultations with African organisations, international organisations, civil society and 
weapons manufacturing countries, the Moratorium was signed in Abuja on 31 October 
1998 for a renewable period of three years. The commitment was renewed both in 
2001 and in 2004.10 On 10 December 1999 the member states signed a Code of 
Conduct for the effective implementation of this mechanism based on agreed 
principles, which encourage transparency in military and security matters.11 The 
Moratorium lays a foundation for a region-wide strategy for the handling of the 
problems of SALW. The broad aim of the Moratorium is of course to secure the 
preconditions needed for socio-economic development.12 It also acknowledges that too 
many transnational and informal actors are involved in all conflicts in the region and 
that a conflict in one country will, without exception influence others countries. 
Transnational actors are deeply involved in most aspects of the West African arms 
trade. The existence of informal transnational networks is one of the characteristics of 
the neo-patrimonial13 African state. The African state is highly personalised. It is 
practically governed through intertwined webs and bonds of loyalty. The leaders have 
multiple interests and commitments which are often contradictory. The private and the 
public spheres are linked so closely together that they can be seen as one. The 
Moratorium needs to address these characteristics of both Transnationalism and the 
                                                 
9 The phrase ”Moratorium” is defined as “a suspension of an ongoing or planned activity”, 
www.onlinedictionary.com 
10 Vines, Alex (2005) 
11 Fung, Ivor Richard and Kouyatè, Lansana (2000) 
12 Francis, David J., (2001) 
13 Neo-patrimonialism will be further discussed in section 2.3. 
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African state. New Regionalism14 is an attempt to connect the formal and the informal 
processes, it takes into account both regionalism and regionalisation and it recognises 
that not all these processes are leading towards increased integration. It sees 
regionalism as processes taking place at different levels and with a large variety of 
actors involved. The phenomenon of Transnationalism has been included in this 
theoretical framework. Transnationalism is about interactions across borders where 
non-state actors are involved.15 This phenomenon takes place in every region of the 
world but its impact varies substantially. Arms trade in West Africa is conducted by a 
variety of transnational actors ranging from small scale transportation agents to Heads 
of State. The impact of transnational networks is partly decided by the structures of the 
state in which they exist. They have a greater impact in weak states. 
The Moratorium is a framework and within this framework there are a number 
of associated measures that need to be implemented if the moratorium is to be a 
success.16 Among these are establishment of National Commissions, cooperation with 
civil society, coordination of legislation, creation of databases, information and 
education of police- and customs officers regarding surveillance and control. 
The Moratorium is a politically binding document but not legally binding. The signing 
of a moratorium is not enough to stop the proliferation of SALW in West Africa. 
There are many loopholes in the Moratorium but no sanctions. All in all, this allows 
West African governments to still import weapons for tens of millions of US dollars 
every year. But the Moratorium is still a step in the right direction. The next step after 
signing was to make the Code of Conduct document for the implementation and then 
the process of implementation. A Plan of Action was also made. Both these documents 
and the actual process of implementation will be the focus of my thesis.  
 
1.2.2. The Research Question 
I will investigate the Moratorium and its implementation through the lenses of 
the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), Transnationalism and the characteristics of 
the African state. It is not the aim of this study to evaluate the success or failure of the 
                                                 
14 New Regionalism will be presented in sections 1.2.3 and 2.2. 
15 A more comprehensive definition of Transnationalism will follow in section 1.2.3. 
16 Lodgaard, Sverre (1999) 
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Moratorium and its implementation process as such. The aim is to see if the 
implementation of the Moratorium reflects the main aspects of the theoretical 
framework mentioned above. This statement implies that if the Moratorium is to be a 
success the insight brought forward by these theoretical approaches needs to be 
reflected in the implementation. It needs to do so not because these frameworks should 
be regarded as a cookbook for the politicians but because they describe many aspects 
of the West African reality that must be taken into account when implementing the 
Moratorium. My question is:  
 
“To what extent does the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons, its implementation documents and its 
actual implementation, reflect  the central aspects of New Regionalism such as 
Transnationalism and Neo-patrimonialism in the West African region?” 
 
1.2.3 Theoretical Approach: New Regionalism and Transnationalism 
Transnationalism is an important aspect regarding the problem of SALW. New 
Regionalism is a theory that focuses on Transnationalism. That is the reason why I 
want to see if the implementation is reflecting the most central aspects of this 
regionalist theory and especially Transnationalism and important aspects of the 
African state. In this section I will give a short presentation of New Regionalism 
focusing primarily on Transnationalism.17  
New Regionalism starts from the proposition that in order to understand 
regionalism today it is essential to realise that we are dealing with a qualitatively new 
phenomenon that is taking place in a new context and with a new content.18 Hettne and 
Söderbaum have defined regionalism in the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) as “a 
comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process, implying the change of a 
particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a 
number of dimensions, the most important being culture, economic policies and 
political regimes.”19 This means that NRA looks beyond state-centrism. Actors other 
                                                 
17 For more on New Regionalism and theories on the African state, see the next chapter. 
18 Söderbaum, Fredrik (2002), p.13 
19 Hettne, Bjørn and Söderbaum, Fredrik (1998) 
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than the state are deeply involved. These non-state actors can be NGOs, transnational 
networks (both legal and illegal) and the private sector. The informal sector is 
particularly important in Africa. It is estimated that between 60-70% of the actual 
economy takes place outside the formal economy.20 But it is not always easy to 
distinguish between the formal and the informal in Africa or between the legitimate 
and the criminal. State officials do often play quite significant parts in the informal 
economy. A living informal economy can be viewed as a precondition for the 
existence of transnational networks.   
As a phenomenon, Transnationalism has been included in the theory of NRA. 
Risse-Kappen has defined it as “(...) regular interactions across national boundaries 
when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization”.21 It is important to understand why 
these trans-state networks exist in West Africa. Dokken says that “the weakness of the 
state facilitates the growth of informal networks, and these networks are by nature 
trans-national.”22 This is consistent with Risse-Kappen when he states that domestic 
structures are likely to determine the availability of channels for transnational actors 
into the political systems. The more the state dominates the domestic structure, the 
more difficult it will be for trans-state networks to penetrate it.23  Bøås makes a 
distinction between regionalisation led by state actors, called “formal regionalisation” 
and regionalisation led by non-state actors, called “informal regionalisation”.24 But it 
is also important to consider the transnationalisation led by one state actor and one 
non-state actor. This informal process is important because it reflects the duality of 
West African states. If we put too much emphasis on informal regionalisation, we 
might neglect the role of the state. It is important to look at how states influence both 
international politics of the region and how they affect the way in which informal 
actors operate.25 It is important because variation in domestic structures accounts for 
differences in the policy impact of transnational actors.26 Private actors run the 
                                                 
20 Bøås, Morten (2005a) 
21 Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995), p.3 
22 Dokken, Karin (2004), p.5 
23 Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995), p.6 
24 Bøås, Morten (2003), p.35 
25 Dokken, Karin (2004), p.6 
26 Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995), p.33 
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informal Transnationalism though often in a concealed cooperation with state actors. 
Such informal transnationalism is built up in networks loosely based on a special 
situation or cause. They can be small networks distributing goods and services across 
borders with no official control or they can be regional networks connected to the 
global economy of drugs and weapons.27 
 
1.2.4 My Approach to the Problem: The Moratorium and New Regionalism 
Transnational networks, which constitute the system within which the main 
actors in the proliferation of SALW exist, are indeed an important part of the 
regionalisation processes in West Africa. The borders in this region have always been 
porous and this porousness has been further enhanced by the process of 
regionalisation. Porous borders make smuggling and illegal trading easier. This is one 
of the main challenges of regionalism. ECOWAS has taken some steps to recognise 
the informal sector and the informal border economy. The question is whether it is 
sufficient. Do ECOWAS member states take these “networks of plunder” sufficiently 
into account in the process of policy making and in implementing the Moratorium? 
Though not an exclusively African phenomenon, African leaders are known for their 
willingness to sign treaties followed by their unwillingness or inability to implement 
them. This is what Daniel Bach calls “summit-diplomacy”, i.e. empty promises 
intended only to display statehood and statesmanship and to impress donors. African 
leaders are known to tell the West whatever it wants to hear in order to obtain 
economic backing. But mainly it is the lack of political will that makes such treaties 
almost worthless. Do the governments of ECOWAS member states use regionalism as 
a means to stop the proliferation of small arms or do they use it to hide their personal 
interests or those of the regime? Are the new initiatives a sign of a newborn will to do 
something about the proliferation of SALW or are they just a facade of meaningless 
words? As I mentioned above, it is not always easy to distinguish the legitimate from 
the criminal and the formal from the informal in the African neo-patrimonial state. 
Due to the pervasiveness and nature of West African Transnationalism, the state or 
officers of the state are often involved in the trade in small arms. It is therefore 
                                                 
27 Bøås, Morten and Dokken, Karin (2002), p.15 
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important to take into account this double-dealing of the state. In this study I will 
address these subjects but I will not comprehensively analyse all of them. 
 
1.3 Research Method 
1.3.1 Case Studies 
This is a case study of the way in which West Africa is trying to cope with the 
SALW problem. A case study has a distinct advantage when “a “how” or “why” 
question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator 
has little or no control”.28 According to Yin`s technical definition, “a case study is an 
empirical inquiry, that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are 
not clearly evident.”29 As one can see from this definition, my choice of research 
question and the presentation of my approach, a case study is the most appropriate 
choice of research method and it gives me the most fruitful answer to my research 
question. What I will do is to look at an interesting case in light of a phenomenon, 
which is already described in NRA. In other words, I am using a theory to shed light 
on a particular case. This is a type of study, which emphasises the understanding of a 
single phenomenon. I am not focusing on building models or being able to empirically 
generalise. I am just focusing on understanding this specific case. 
 
1.3.2 Methodological Considerations 
There are methodological problems connected with this kind of case study both 
regarding validity and reliability. Is the operational set of measures sufficient? Is it 
possible to use the findings to generalise? Are the findings biased?30 In a case study 
such as this, one has to be aware of these issues.  
 
1.3.2.1. Generalisation 
First of all, I am not seeking to find any general truths when doing this study. 
My conclusion is meant to be applicable only to this specific case with no prospects of 
                                                 
28 Yin, Robert K. (1994), p.9 
29 ibid. p.13 
30 Ibid. p.34-36 
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empirical generalisation. There is an ongoing discussion on the value of research that 
formulates no grounds for empirical generalisation. Some would say that the scientific 
value of such a study is limited due to the lack of possibilities for empirical 
generalisation. But I will argue that it is possible to theoretically generalise from this 
study. By looking at the findings made by such studies in a broader theoretical 
perspective one can expect to see compliance with the theoretical tools which I have 
used and that will strengthen the theory as such. And if the results show that not all 
aspects of the empirical material are possible to analyse through the lenses of this 
theoretical framework that can be regarded as proof of the limitations of the theory in 
question. That must be seen as a valuable scientific finding although no empirical 
generalisation is possible. 
 
1.3.2.2. Validity 
Regarding my research question there might be questions raised about the 
internal validity31 of my findings. Although it is not directly stated in my research 
question, it is implied that there exists a causal relation between the success of the 
Moratorium and consistency with the theories used. This is not to say that NRA is a 
recipe from A to Z for the politicians to use in the implementation process. What I am 
saying is that NRA quite accurately describes African, and then also West African 
regionalism. Therefore, if the politicians are to give due considerations to the realities 
in their region, the implementation of the Moratorium will have to reflect the most 
important aspects of NRA and Transnationalism. The implication of this casual 
relation is a methodological problem, which I am aware of and will try to address by 
arguing that NRA is the most fitting theoretical tool for investigating regionalism in 
West Africa and that a regionalist project in West Africa, such as the Moratorium, 
must reflect the central aspects of this theory in order to succeed.  
Another thing to be aware of is the fact that a case can be interpreted quite 
differently given the theoretical setting. “(...) our understanding of such events 
depends critically on more self-consciousness about what observers bring to the 
analysis. What each analyst sees and judges to be important is not only a function of 
                                                 
31 Internal validity concerns the causal interpretation of data. Is A the cause of B? 
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the evidence about what happened. But also of the “conceptual lenses” through which 
he looks at the evidence”32 Concerning my case, NRA is today accepted as the 
dominating theory of African regionalism. The classic theories such as Neo-
functionalism have proven insufficient in dealing with the African reality.33 Although 
there are important elements in all the “old” regionalism theories, I feel that the only 
way of analysing the West African reality today is to do it through the lenses of NRA. 
Another methodological issue is the generality of the theoretical terms. It is 
important that the terms are not too general. If they are too general there will be a 
loose and diffuse connection between theory and data.34 New Regionalism was 
developed much in light of the African case. The West African reality is quite typical 
of Africa so as I see it, the connection between the theoretical terms in New 
Regionalism and the West African case is sufficiently close. 
 
1.3.2.3. Reliability, Sources and Data Collection 
Yin mentions six main sources of evidence one can use in a case study. The two 
I will use are documentation and archival records. The strengths of these are that they 
are stable, unobtrusive, and exact and they have a broad coverage. Their weaknesses 
are that they may have low retrievability, authors may have been biased and access can 
also be a problem.35 To study African affairs is a little bit different from studying for 
example European affairs. As Yin mentions, official documents are scarce and 
difficult to find. The content of those that can be found is of limited help to 
researchers, in part because on cannot place much trust in them. Pragmatism is 
commonly used in politics and especially in African politics. This has led to several 
situations where a state has signed documents with contradictory goals. I am not 
implying that African politics is in any respect irrational, Rather, African politics 
involves a different kind of rationality with different motives and priorities than those 
we know from classic Western and state-centric IR theory. Policies, protocols, charters 
and treaties are often sacrificed on behalf of pragmatism or they are formulated in 
                                                 
32 Allison, Graham (1969), p.689 
33 For more on this subject see Dokken, Karin (1997)  
34 Andersen, Svein S. (1997), p.70 
35 Yin, Robert K. (1994), p.80 
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order to reach a specific goal such as looking good for possible donors. This can be 
seen in light of what I above referred to as summit-diplomacy and also the many 
different identities of African leaders.36 One can make a plausible argument for saying 
that the single most important motive in African politics is regime security, the 
survival of the ruler. And if a pragmatic and ad hoc-based approach is what is needed 
to secure regime security, then that is what will be done. Reports written by NGOs 
may also be biased although often in the opposite direction of that of public 
documents. Independent reports are scarce. In this thesis I will use academic sources 
such as books and articles, official ECOWAS documents, reports and articles from 
non-state actors such as NGOs but most important regarding reliability will be the 
independent sources. First and foremost I will use academic publications such as 
books and articles. As far as one can trust secondary literature, I view these as reliable 
sources for my study. I will also use reports made by organisations such as the UN, 
NISAT (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers), Small Arms Survey and 
Global Witness, which I also consider to be relatively reliant. Because most official 
documents are of questionable reliability, I will not use them as sources. News articles 
can also be questionable regarding objectivity so these must be used with caution. 
Some of my sources are collected from the internet. This might cause problems 
because they might not be available for longer periods of time. 
Yin also presents three principles of data collection. The first of these is to use 
multiple sources of evidence.37 I will use two of six possible sources of evidence, 
relying mainly on documentation. The aim of using multiple sources is data 
triangulation, this in order for the case study to be more convincing and accurate. My 
reason for not using the four other main sources of evidence, which are direct 
observations, participant-observation, interviews and physical artefacts, is an 
evaluation of the costs compared to the anticipated gains. Doing fieldwork would have 
been expensive and it would, in my opinion, probably not have given me any great 
research advantage. It was unlikely that I could gain access to useful information from 
the ECOWAS Secretariat, governments, and other institutions involved in 
                                                 
36 The subject of changing identities will be discussed in chapter 4. 
37Yin, Robert K. (1994), p. 90 
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implementing the Moratorium. For this reason, I will exclusively use secondary 
literature, which is literature written on the basis of previously collected data. I will 
use numerous reports written about the implementation process, by independent actors, 
scholars, NGOs and state and intergovernmental actors. The number of sources from 
various actors will hopefully ensure satisfactory triangulation and better reliability of 
my findings. In line with what Sørensen has argued, I do not believe that I will 
increase the validity of my study by using multiple sources as part of the same study 
but I do believe it will increase the reliability. 38 
The phenomenon I am going to study is multidimensional and multifaceted. It 
will be a challenge to be able to catch all dimensions in order to see the whole picture 
and scope of the problem and to see through the often unreliable public documents of 
African states and organisations in order to secure the validity of my findings. This is a 
subject where a huge variety of actors have deep interests and often one actor can have 
contradictory goals and hidden motives. This is not an uncommon feature in IR 
research but still it will make it more difficult to unravel the true facts of the 
situation.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Sørensen, K.O.G. (2004), p.12 
39 A presentation of my operationalisation will follow in section 2.5 
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2. Theoretical Approach 
As explained above, the theory I will use in this study is NRA with a special 
focus on the processes of Transnationalism. I will also use theories of the African state 
because the aspects imbedded in these theories, such as Neo-patrimonialism, are also 
inherent in NRA and the way in which Transnationalism displays itself in the region. 
Before presenting them I will present developments in African regionalism. 
 
2.1 The Waves of Regionalism 
The first wave of African regionalism commenced in the post-colonial era of 
the 1960s. It was characterized by Pan-Africanism which was not a consistent political 
program but rather a set of ideas.40 The subject of African unity was from the outset a 
struggle between two different approaches. One wanted immediate political 
unification. The other favoured incremental cooperation in specific sectors leading to 
unification. The majority supported the latter approach.41 Theoretically, Neo-
functionalism was dominant. The success of the EC was a prime example in the minds 
of African leaders. The most influential figure in this era was Kwame Nkrumah42. In 
his mind, the fragile African state born of the history of colonialism was too weak, too 
poor and too politically vulnerable to serve the needs of the people after the heroic 
struggle for independence.43 Another influential figure was Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania. He believed that although continental unity was politically desirable, it 
could not be implemented at once. It had to be done in steps.44 The first wave did not 
succeed. In the late 1980s and 1990s thoughts of regionalism found new strength. This 
second wave of regionalism was a response to the end of the Cold War and the 
transformation of the global political economy.45 The general belief in the increasingly 
globalised world was that if Africa was not able to regionalise, the whole continent 
would be further marginalised. The birth of NRA was a response to this second wave 
of regionalism. It was also an acknowledgement of the fact that the classical 
                                                 
40 Bøås, Morten and Dokken, Karin (2002), p.77 
41 Senghor, Jeggan C. (1990) 
42 Nkrumah’s “Africa must unite” (1963) is regarded as one of the most influential works on African regionalism 
in this period.  
43 Nyong`o, Anyang (1990), p.3 
44 ibid, p.5 
45 Francis, David J. (2001), p.63 
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integration theories such as Functionalism, Neo-functionalism, Federalism and 
Communication Theory were not applicable to Africa.46 This is not to say that African 
leaders were cognisant of, and followed NRA. My point is merely to say that at the 
same time as African leaders commenced the second wave of regionalism, scientist 
such as Hettne and Söderbaum saw the need for, and presented the ideas of NRA. The 
classical institutionalistic integration theories were also completely unable to catch the 
processes of Transnationalism, which are so important in Africa. A new approach to 
regionalism and integration based on the preconditions of Third World countries, and 
especially Africa was indeed needed. NRA was a response to this.  
 
2.2 New Regionalism Approach 
The global political earthquake of 1989-90 transcended the whole international 
system. When the bipolar world collapsed, the global community was in a state of 
uncertainty. There was a new world order on the way. The process of globalisation has 
also been a trend of the last two decades. Some may say that globalisation is an old 
process, which has been going on for many more decades but it is quite clear that the 
process has accelerated and been firmly put high on the agenda of international policy 
makers. And it is clear that globalisation and regionalisation are intimately connected, 
together shaping the new world order.47 The study of IR has been dominated by state-
centrism. Traditional IR theory has almost uncritically accepted the Westphalia 
model.48 The state has been the primary unit of analysis and it has not been properly 
problematised. This is not to say that there has been no criticism of this notion but 
generally speaking, traditional IR theory has seen the state as the primary unit of 
analysis. It is not the objective of this study to go deeper into the notion of state-
centrism in traditional IR but what is clear is that this way of analysing IR is not a 
                                                 
46 There are mainly two factors, which make them inconsistent with the African reality. (1) They presuppose 
some degree of economic and technological interdependence between the countries integrating and (2) they all 
favours societies with a high enough economic and technological level as well as democratic development in 
order to benefit from integration. None of these factors have been present in Africa. For more on this, see 
Dokken, Karin (1997) 
47 Söderbaum, Fredrik (2002), p.13 
48 The Westphalia model refers to the modern Western model of the state, which was marked by the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. It was the birth of the nation-state. The Westphalia state is characterised among other things 
by its sovereignty in the relationship with other states, centrally controlled, its monopoly on the use of violence, 
and securing property rights. 
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fruitful framework for analysing IR in Africa. By concentrating mainly on the state, 
traditional IR theory has not been able to explain, let alone predict, the behaviour of 
African political actors.49 
It is in this context NRA emerged. As Grant and Söderbaum wrote, “It seems 
appropriate therefore to recognize the need to transcend purely state-centric notions of 
not only the disciplines of IR and IPE, but of regionalism as well.”50 The old school 
claimed that regionalism in Africa was primitive and lead by weak, failing or totally 
failed states. This picture is too simplistic. There are multiple actors in the African 
state and society, which are linked together in hybrid networks and coalitions, together 
creating a wide range of complex regionalisation processes in response to their 
political, economic and social needs.51 
Although regionalism is not a new phenomenon, it is important to understand 
regionalism today as a qualitatively new phenomenon that is taking place in a new 
context and with a new content.52 Starting with the region itself, there has been a 
widespread assumption that regions exist in their own right without needing to be 
defined, a belief in the “natural region”. But there are many types of regions. Most 
commonly what we refer to as regions are macro-regions, for instance Africa. Then we 
have sub-regions, such as West Africa. We can also talk about micro-regions, which 
exist both within states and across national borders. But the definition of a region 
should not be formulated solely on the basis of geography. Hveem states that 
geography is one of three ways to define a region. The other two are by the existence 
of networks or structures for transactions and communication and by cognitive 
patterns and collective identity.53 Old regionalism has tended to only focus on the 
state-led regionalism and not see the way in which all the processes at different levels 
are linked and intertwined. As Hettne et al have explained: 
 
Regionalism is a heterogeneous, comprehensive, multidimensional phenomenon,  
taking place in several sectors and often “pushed” (or rather constructed) by a variety  
                                                 
49 Malaquias, Assis (2001) 
50 Grant, J. Andrew & Söderbaum, Fredrik (2003), p.1 
51 ibid. 
52 Söderbaum, Fredrik (2002), p.13 
53 Hveem, Helge (2000), p.72 
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of actors (state, market, society). We are likely to experience regionalization at various  
speeds in various sectors as well as regionalization and de-regionalization occurring at  
the same time. In other words, integration and disintegration are closely connected and  
must be analysed within the same framework.54 
 
NRA as presented by Hettne and Söderbaum defines regionalism as “a comprehensive, 
multifaceted and multidimensional process, implying the change of a particular region 
from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of 
dimensions, the most important being culture, economic policies and political 
regimes.”55 Because of different actors and all of the processes they are dealing with, 
New Regionalism is often referred to as “new regionalisms”. All the processes are 
overlapping and often contradictory. West African regionalism involves individuals 
trading across borders, small-scale smuggling, ambitious intergovernmental projects, 
international criminal networks, and not least, huge migrations. And these processes 
can be contradictory. Not all processes of regionalisation lead to more comprehensive 
integration. Some regionalisation processes are working against it. NRA has also been 
referred to as “regionalism from below”. This is because NRA involves more 
spontaneous and informal processes, which often emerge from below rather than as 
products of decisions from above. NRA is an attempt to connect the formal and the 
informal processes. What this definition also implies is that the process is taking place 
at three levels: at the global level, the inter-regional level and the intra-regional level. 
That regionalism takes place at different levels is important to remember. What is also 
important to understand is the difference between regionalism and regionalisation. 
Marchand et al. say that regionalism “concerns the ideas, identities and ideologies 
related to a regional project”.56 In other words, it is the urge by the actors to re-
organise along regional lines in a given issue area.57 Regionalisation is defined as “the 
process by which state and non-state actors seek to enhance their economic, political, 
cultural, social and security interaction with societal forces within a region through 
                                                 
54 Hettne, Bjørn, Inotai, Andreas and Sunkel, Osvaldo (1999) 
55 Hettne, Bjørn and Söderbaum, Fredrik (1998) 
56 Lee, Margaret (2003), p.8 
57 Grant, J. Andrew & Söderbaum, Fredrik (2003), p.7 
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formal or informal structures.”58 The critical thing here is that regionalisation is not 
necessarily caused by regionalism. It may be caused by regionalism but it may also 
occur regardless of whether there is a regionalist project and ideology present. It can 
even be unintentional.59 But still, NRA takes both these processes into account. NRA 
seeks to establish regional coherence and a regional identity. This is what Hettne refers 
to as “the pursuit of regionness”. This is a process in which one can reach different 
levels of regionness. A region is always changing.60 As stated above, there are no 
natural regions. Regions are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed in the 
process of global transformation. This might be intentional or it might be 
unintentional.61 The level of regionness thus defines the position of a particular region 
in terms of regional coherence and identity. Hettne speaks of five levels of regionness 
reaching from the regional space, e.g. the geographical area, to a regional 
institutionalised polity where the region is an “acting subject with a distinct identity, 
actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making.”62 Together these levels 
form a sort of “natural history” of regionalisation. 63 
 
2.3 The African State 
In order to understand New Regionalism in Africa it is important to understand 
the way in which the African state works and its differences from the Western 
bureaucratic state model. The African state has a stable and static surface while at the 
same time hosting an entire sub-system where formal and informal transnational 
processes lead to continued change. It is of immense importance to understand that the 
African state cannot be treated and analysed as a uniform rational actor in foreign and 
international politics.64 There are several reasons for this. The typical African state is 
weak. Clapham states that there are mainly three ways in which African states fail to 
live up to the ideal. These are: (1) lack of governmental legitimacy, (2) lack of 
territorial legitimacy and (3) inability to exercise effective control over the territory 
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allocated to it.65  The main source of governmental legitimacy has been acceptance of 
the government by the international community. This fact can be seen in relation with 
Jackson’s term “Quasi-statehood”. Quasi-states are states recognised as sovereign and 
independent units by other states and have thereby acquired juridical sovereignty but 
they cannot meet the demands of “empirical” statehood, which requires the capacity to 
exercise effective power within their territory and be able to defend themselves against 
external attacks.66 It would also require the ability to function as a state in fulfilling the 
economic, social and security needs of the population. In short, the state lacks the 
institutional capacities normally ascribed to a sovereign state.67 These states have what 
has been termed “negative sovereignty”. The negative sovereignty regime led to a 
system where external states to a certain degree decided who the government was. In 
the extreme, those who controlled the most important buildings in the capital were 
given this external governmental legitimacy (“Letterbox sovereignty”).68 An example 
is Zaire/DRC after the Cold War. The state’s control effectively ended some few 
hundred kilometres outside Kinshasa. The state was neither the sole, nor the central 
harbinger of power.69 Some insurgent groups have often behaved as much as a state as 
the state itself and this phenomenon has only grown stronger. Some extractive 
corporations have also performed functions normally fulfilled by the state, such as the 
development of infrastructure. Quasi-statehood can also be related to Reno’s term, 
“the shadow state”.70 He says that the shadow state is the real state, where decisions 
are made while the theatre state is just an imitation of the Western model of the state 
with no real power. 
The West African state is also characterised as Neo-patrimonial. It is not a 
patrimonial state but it is patrimonialised.71 Patrimonialism was first presented by Max 
Weber and developed further by Medard. The defining feature of Patrimonialism is the 
absence of a distinction between the public and the private spheres.72 In the African 
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state the distinction is there, it is just not often internalised or respected. Political 
power is personalised instead of having the abstract character of legal-rational 
domination such as the ideal-type of the modern Western state. The formal structure of 
the state is bureaucratic but in reality it is more like an empty shell. Medard says that 
the very essence of Patrimonialism consists in the idea that the whole government 
authority and the economic rights which correspond to it, tend to be treated as 
privately appropriated economic advantages and that government powers and their 
associated advantages are treated as private rights.73 The logic of Patrimonialism is the 
personalisation of power, which means that there is no distinction between the office 
and the officeholder. There is a lack of differentiation between what is political and 
what is economic and access to the state becomes the main way of acquiring wealth.74 
One of the implications of Neo-patrimonialism is what Medard refers to as the 
“criminalization of the state”. This happens when the leaders extract too much through 
the patrimonialised system and thereby destroy the very economic basis of the state.75 
There are several examples of this happening in Africa. Mobutu’s Zaire is one; 
Uganda under Idi Amin is another. When this happens there is nothing more to extract 
and the people will have to seek alternative sources of income, often by illegal means. 
Another work, which focuses on the African state and its poor degree of 
institutionalisation, is the work of Chabal and Daloz. They state that the African state 
was never properly institutionalised because it was never significantly emancipated 
from society. They say that the key to a modern state is the successful establishment of 
a truly independent bureaucracy. This would mean the end of Patrimonialism. The 
approach presented rests on the paradigm of political instrumentalisation of disorder, 
i.e. the profit to be found in the weak institutionalisation of political practices. This 
means that it has never been in the interest of the political elites in Africa to 
institutionalise the state apparatus. In this sense, the view that Africa is working 
towards a more institutionalised state is wrong.76 This approach, which focuses on the 
lack of institutionalisation and the still flourishing personalised power, then directs 
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attention towards the political elites in the African state. They have been remarkably 
durable. Even through the process of democratisation, in terms of new arrangements 
for elections and the move from one-party rule to multi-partyism, they have often 
stayed at the top. This can largely be attributed to the focus on and importance of 
patronage in the African society. Even though a new leadership bringing in new ideas 
and political reforms is desirable, people tend to stick to their old patrons, who they 
know can provide them with their everyday basic needs. Ideology has been of 
secondary importance in Africa. The primary focus of the elites has been to acquire the 
patrimonial means needed to keep their clients reasonably happy and by doing so, 
upholding a patrimonialised system and personalised power. People do not vote 
because they support the ideas of a particular leader or party, but because they must 
placate the demands of their existing or putative patron.77 The conclusion which can be 
drawn from this is that political change has not changed the role of the elites or the 
nature of the leadership.78 
All these different views on the African state are not contradictory. They are a 
typology of states. They differ in some aspects but mostly they are complimentary. 
 
2.4 Transnationalism 
Transnationalism is one of the main aspects of NRA and the transnational 
processes are very influential in the West African reality. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Risse-Kappen defines Transnationalism as “(...) regular interactions across 
national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on 
behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization”.79 What is 
important to notice about this definition is that it takes into account the possibility of 
state participation in Transnationalism.80 Often Transnationalism is regarded as 
processes not formally controlled and thereby implying that states are not taking part 
in it. This is not the case in West Africa. Risse-Kappen’s definition includes the state 
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and is therefore very relevant for my study. As one can see from this definition, 
Transnationalism can be both formal and informal. My focus, however, will primarily 
be on the informal part of Transnationalism. 
Nobody denies the existence of transnational relations. They are present in all 
regions of the world. But they impact on state and society differently and they proceed 
in a different manner depending on the region/country. Risse-Kappen argues that the 
impact of transnational actors on state policies is affected by two variables. The first is 
differences in state structures, meaning both the normative and the organisational 
arrangements, which form state and society and link them together.81 As Dokken 
states, transnational networks exist in West Africa because their existence is facilitated 
by the weakness of the state,82 i.e. the weaker and more fragmented the state is, the 
more impact transnational actors will have on state policies. If transnational actors are 
to affect state policies, they must overcome two obstacles. (1) They must gain access 
to the political system and (2) they must generate or contribute to “winning” policy 
coalitions.83 In the African context it is quite obvious to see how this can happen. The 
African state is dominated by a wide range of patron-client relationships and equally 
wide range of bonds of loyalty. Also, corruption flourishes and the state is generally 
poorly organised. In this context, overcoming those two hurdles mentioned above is a 
feasible task because it facilitates the existence of an informal economy. Thus, gaining 
access to the political system is a function of the state structure. 
The second variable is the degree of international institutionalisation. Some 
issue-areas are regulated by bilateral arrangements, some by multilateral regimes, and 
some by international organisations. State autonomy and governmental control over 
policies are affected by the degree to which the state is embedded in international 
structures. The more these issue-areas are regulated by international norms, the more 
permeable state boundaries should become for transnational activities.84 The reason for 
this is that highly regulated and cooperative structures of international governance tend 
to legitimise transnational activities and increase their access to national policies. But 
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while differences in domestic structures affect state autonomy from below, variations 
in international institutions affect the state from above.85 
Risse-Kappen also divides transnational actors into two groups. One group 
consist of those motivated by economic gains. In this group are found TNCs, MNCs 
and also the more informal and often illegal transnational networks important to the 
proliferation of small arms. The other group consists of those whose goal is to promote 
ideological ideas and knowledge. In this group are found a whole range of NGOs and 
INGOs.86 Ideally one should not find the state, as a transnational actor, in the first 
group. Unfortunately, the reality in West Africa is not ideal. Many state officials are 
often motivated by personal gain. 
As in the rest of the world, transnational actors play an important part in West 
Africa. Krasner has argued that transnational actors can only exist in a system in which 
there are multiple centres of political authority. Only if official state actors conducted 
all interactions across borders, would there be no transnational actors.87 It is not an 
uncommon situation in Africa to find that people direct their political loyalty as much 
towards insurgent groups as they do towards the state. Insurgents can possess as much 
political legitimacy among the people as the state. The state is often just in control of 
the areas around the urban centres.88 This is related to what Clapham has stated about 
the degrees of statehood. What he suggests is that statehood should be regarded as a 
relative concept. Rather than distinguishing sharply between state and non-state 
entities, he suggests that we should regard different entities as meeting the criteria for 
statehood to a greater or lesser degree.89 Krasner’s point can also be seen as coherent 
with Realism in the way that he is saying that transnational actors will only exist in a 
system of anarchy, and in Realism, anarchy is the main feature of the international 
system . So, Krasner’s point applies both to the national and to the international level 
in Africa. 
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Nowhere else in the world is the informal cross border economy as big as in 
Africa. Non-states actors dominate several aspects of cross border economies in 
Africa.90 Transnational networks can be both formal and informal. It is important not 
to focus only on the informal ones because one risks loosing sight of the importance of 
the states. Although there are several important non-state actors in Transnationalism, 
the state is clearly significant and its relevance must not be underestimated even 
though the African state is weak.91 The case of West Africa shows that states may take 
part in the informal transnational networks as well as in the formal networks. 
Transnational relations can be viewed in terms of relational power in the way 
that the behaviour of the participants and the outcome of their actions are a function of 
the capabilities of the different actors, both the public and the private actors. The 
state’s role in this varies. The state will be indifferent to some kinds of transnational 
flows, oppose some, and encourage others. Transnationalism may frustrate or promote 
state objectives. It may be influenced, promoted or opposed by states. But states can 
never block all transnational flows.92 The goal should rather be to regulate them. 
To outline a precise definition of the way transnational actors organise is 
difficult due to at least three facts. First, transnational actors are not a coherent group 
but rather a whole set of distinctly different types of actors. For one thing, the 
transnational actors can be distinguished according to their degree of 
institutionalisation. The most institutionalised transnational relation is INGOs and 
MNCs.93 Informal networks or alliances based only on informal understandings are the 
least institutionalised. Second, the way they organise varies because they must adjust 
to the environment in which they operate, i.e. the different state structures.94 Third, 
different transnational actors each possess unique kinds of resources and unique goals, 
which also will affect the way in which they organise. 
In this study I will look at the process of implementation of the Moratorium 
through the lenses of these theoretical tools. I will direct attention towards the ways in 
which the implementation process reflects or fails to reflect the insights of these 
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theoretical perspectives. If the theory is not relevant in all the different aspects, that 
will be an interesting finding because it can then be viewed as a limitation of NRA and 
Transnationalism and might therefore bring new insight to the further development of 
NRA.  
 
2.5. Operationalisation 
In order for me to be able to answer my research question, a workable 
operationalisation is needed. What exactly am I going to search for? An operational 
definition is needed because it will define what operations I will need to complete in 
order to answer my research question accurately.95 Any analysis requires coherence 
between the theoretical and operational definitions. To decide whether the 
implementation process falls under the central theoretical terms, I measure the 
theoretical definition by looking at how both the formal and the informal processes, so 
central in NRA, are included in the implementation process. I will look at how neo-
patrimonial aspects in the states are addressed, e.g. changing identities and roles of 
statesmen, corruption, the lack of a divide between the public and the private spheres 
and personalised power. Are illegal trading networks given due attention? Are the 
double-dealings of states and state actors properly addressed as a problem? Are 
ordinary people included in the process? Has ECOWAS adopted a top-down 
approach? Has regionalism from below been given appropriate attention? Are the 
formal state-led processes the main focus or are more spontaneous and informal 
processes included? Are the member states of ECOWAS addressing the distrust that 
exists between them and limits the possibility for transparency and cooperation? All 
these questions are related to the most important aspects of the theories I will use, and 
they will help me answer my research question.  
The actors must be included in the operationalisation as well. To define what I 
am searching for, I must also define who I am searching for. Therefore, it is necessary 
to define the transnational actors involved in the regionalisation processes and in the 
proliferation of SALW in West Africa. By doing so, and including this in my 
operationalisation, I will have a working platform to study West African 
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Transnationalism and to see whether the implementation process of the Moratorium is 
reflecting these processes.  
The first group of transnational actors are the states. As the definition of 
Transnationalism implies, one of the actors in these interactions may very well be a 
state, and in the West African case, this is clearly so. But Western states, especially 
those that are important weapons manufacturers, are also important state actors. For 
the purpose of my thesis, I will direct my main focus at the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
which was involved in the making of the Moratorium.96 The next group of 
transnational actors are the informal (and mainly illegal) networks which are involved 
in weapons trade and weapons smuggling. Many private businessmen are deeply 
involved in these networks. The third group consists of formal non-state actors, mainly 
weapons manufacturers. However, this group also includes a variety of NGOs and 
INGOs. Finally, civil society is a group that also has an important role to play in the 
implementation process.  Maybe the most important civil society organisation in 
Africa is the Church. Women’s organisations are also an influential force within civil 
society. 
These are the issues and actors I will analyse in order to answer my research 
question. The next chapter will present the West African region, ECOWAS and the 
Moratorium. 
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security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in the weapons trade. (The Wassenaar 
Arrangement web page, http://www.wassenaar.org/welcomepage.html) 
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3. West Africa, ECOWAS and the Moratorium on the Importation, 
    Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
3.1 Features of the Region 
Before going into ECOWAS and its characteristics as a regional organisation, I 
will briefly go through the characteristics of the West Africa because ECOWAS, as all 
regional organisations, is a reflection of its region’s characteristics and needs. 
West Africa consists of 16 sovereign countries with a total population of 240 
million.97 The 16countries are comprised of three linguistic groups: Francophone (9 
countries), Anglophone (5 countries) and Lusophone (2 countries). These divides are 
more than mere linguistic. Especially the divide between the Francophone and the 
Anglophone countries is still quite visible. But the distinction between them is 
decreasing. West Africa consists mostly of small states but still very different in size. 
The distribution of natural resources is also uneven. Great economic potential and 
huge population has made Nigeria the closest to a regional hegemon, implying that its 
potential has never been fulfilled. When also considering the cultural, religious and 
political differences it is fair to say that the region of West Africa is not homogenous 
although the heterogeneity is decreasing. 
Economically West Africa is reliant on export of agricultural products and the 
extractions of natural resources. In 2002 the average GDP growth rate was 3.8%. 
Average Per capita GDP was $US 304.98 Politically West African states have 
developed centralised and personalised power structures, one-party rule and military 
dictatorships. The security structure of the West African states is devoted to the 
preservation of the regime and the undermining of those who oppose it.99 The 
governments in West Africa have not been very stable and there were actually 41 
successful military coups between 1963 and 1999.100 Despite this, some regimes have 
shown a remarkable endurance such as the 38 years of rule by Gnassingbe Eyadema in 
Togo. West African states have been somewhat democratised during the late 1980s 
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and the 1990s but still, good governance is far from being a feature of the region. 
Socially the region is characterised by a wide disparity in distribution of wealth and 
income among the population and between the urban centres and rural areas. The 
population is dominated by young people with no education or other skills they can 
use to function effectively in a modern society. A semi-permanent state of social 
exclusion is common among large groups of the population.101 
All of these features have contributed to the making of West Africa into a 
hotbed of political, economic and social agitation. This has resulted in the growth of 
insurgent and revolutionary movements supported largely by economically 
marginalised youths and power motivated members of the elite. 
As a region, West Africa is interesting because it, according to Kacowicz, since 
decolonisation has been a zone of “negative peace”. The term “negative peace” refers 
to a region characterised by relative international peace and domestic war. He further 
argues that “this condition of negative peace is quite remarkable, given the multiethnic 
and multinational character of the member states and the persistence of numerous 
territorial disputes. Moreover, this lack of international wars starkly contrasts with 
widespread domestic violence, military coups, and virulent civil wars (...)”102 
 
3.2 The Birth of the Economic Community of West African States 
There were several motives behind the formation of ECOWAS. I will briefly go 
trough the most important ones. First of all, the member states saw the formation of a 
regional economic community as a strategy for national and regional development. In 
order to overcome the problem of small size and foreseeing the possibility of an 
internal market of over 200 million consumers, they wanted to create economies of 
scale and to promote their comparative advantages.103 ECOWAS was conceived as a 
means towards economic integration and development intended to lead to the eventual 
establishment of an economic union in West Africa. In addition, the Anglophone 
countries saw ECOWAS as a means to hinder the extensive French influence. But 
ECOWAS was not a homogenous wish of all West African states. Nigeria was the 
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strongest force behind the process with support from the other Anglophone countries. 
Francophone West Africa did not as strongly see the need for a regional arrangement 
mainly because they had the Francophone cooperation. They also saw the possibility 
of Nigerian hegemony, which they strongly opposed. In short, the political divide 
between the Francophone and the Anglophone states, the clash of national interests 
and geopolitics was a big obstacle for the creation of ECOWAS.104 But after some 
years of unsuccessful negotiations and proposals, the ECOWAS Treaty was signed in 
Lagos, Nigeria on 28th May 1975.  
ECOWAS was aimed mainly at economic cooperation. Stated in the Treaty is 
the main objective of the community: “It shall be the aim of the community to promote 
cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity (...)”105 One important 
thing to notice about the Treaty is that it did not lay the foundation for a supranational 
body within the ECOWAS framework.  
 
3.3 Restructuring ECOWAS 
The status of ECOWAS integration after 15 years was not encouraging. The 
activities of ECOWAS were largely overshadowed by security concerns. The lack of 
success in ECOWAS’ aims can be attributed to the lack of commitment by national 
governments made obvious by their reluctance to implement policies at the national 
level, their failure to provide the agreed financial resources and the absence of national 
links with the Secretariat. But there were many more, as I will shortly come to. It 
seemed as though most member states preferred to solve their own economic problems 
instead of using ECOWAS and approach the problems regionally.106 In the early 
1990s, ECOWAS realised the need for transforming the organisation. This need was 
the result of minimal progress in economic and other areas of cooperation, a new 
global situation after the Cold War and a growing consensus that the security crisis 
needed to be dealt with before economic development could succeed. As Adedeji 
stated in 1990, “It will have to be taken radical changes before the organisation will 
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 The ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 
106 The NEPAD web page (2004) 
 30
move from words to deeds (...) and from promises to performance.”107 In light of my 
focus in this study, the most important aspect of the restructuring was the shift of focus 
from economic integration to security cooperation. The revised treaty and the 
formation of ECOMOG have made ECOWAS into a security organisation, not only an 
economic integration scheme. 
 
3.3.1 Problem Areas in ECOWAS Cooperation 
The most important problem of building regional integration within ECOWAS 
has not been within the treaty provisions themselves but their implementation. The 
major problem has been member states’ failure to fully and faithfully implement the 
protocols and decisions of the organisation.108 This is important to bear in mind when 
studying cooperation in West Africa. One of the main reasons for the lack of political 
will109 to implement ECOWAS decisions is the tension between the Anglophone and 
the Francophone countries which has existed ever since independence. This tension 
between the two major blocs in West Africa is increased by the language barrier. Very 
few people master both languages. A general lack of trust also exists. But this is not 
only between the Anglophone and the Francophone. It is also within these two 
blocs.110 The states have been very reluctant in revealing their security and foreign 
policies.111 Another important factor is all the overlapping intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) in the region. At the beginning of the 1990s there were about 30 
IGOs in West Africa.112 These are not only overlapping but sometimes also 
counteracting each other. The most important and extensive cooperative organ besides 
ECOWAS is the cooperation between the Francophone states and France in the CFA 
Franc Zone,113 which was founded as early as 1944. The Francophone cooperation has 
evolved to also comprise an economic community called CEAO (Communuatè 
Economique d’Afrique de l’Ouest) and since 1994, an economic and monetary union 
called UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine). The CFA franc 
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was for 40 years connected to the French Franc. Now it is connected to the Euro. The 
problem is that it is not convertible with other regional currencies. Actually no 
currency in West Africa is convertible with all other regional currencies. This is 
clearly an obstacle for trade. 
The poor state of infrastructure and communication systems is yet another 
problem area regarding ECOWAS cooperation. It severely hinders any form of intra-
regional trade.114 The infrastructural problems are not just a problem regarding trade 
but also regarding administration of ECOWAS. The technical standard and the level of 
organisational skills have been limited. The working conditions have been very hard 
for the secretariat when trying to organise such a huge regional scheme.115 
The last reason for the slow progress in economic integration that I will mention 
is the powerful position of the transnational actors. If an economic union was created 
in West Africa, these networks would stand to loose considerably. Through the 
patrimonialised system, these actors have access to state actors. They are then capable 
of slowing the process down. The actors behind the transnational networks have a 
strong interest in keeping a good relationship between the countries of the region but 
they are strongly opposed to the implementation of regional strategies aimed at the 
liberalisation of customs and tariff barriers, a strategy which would inflict great 
economic losses upon them. A prime example of this was the death of the 
Senegambian Confederation, which was founded in 1982 and ended in 1989.116 
 
3.3.2 The Revised Treaty 
A revised treaty was signed in Contonou, Benin in July 1993. This treaty was 
designed to accelerate economic integration and to increase political cooperation. The 
revised treaty of 1993 designated the achievement of a common market and a single 
currency as economic objectives. In the political sphere it envisaged the establishment 
of a West African parliament, which would be able to take binding decisions without 
the need for ratification. The establishment of an economic and social council and an 
ECOWAS court of justice were also envisaged. The revised treaty sought to create 
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interest and pressure groups supportive of ECOWAS. It also took measures to end the 
frictions between ECOWAS and UEMOA.117 The treaty also formally assigned the 
Community with the responsibility for preventing and settling regional conflicts. In 
dealing with the financial situation the revised treaty envisaged ECOWAS to receive 
revenue from a community tax, based on the total value of imports from member 
states. Member states were requested to ratify the protocol, in order to enable its 
application with effect from 1st January 1997. However, by the summit of December 
1999, some member states had still not ratified the protocol.  
The lack of financial resources is a major constraint on the organisation. It 
makes it almost impossible to accomplish any goals without foreign support and such 
support often comes with conditionalities. The ECOWAS budget for 2000 amounted 
to only US$ 10.3 million, which still was a 26% increase from 1999.118 The revised 
treaty has adopted some measures to deal with the problem of member states not 
contributing as much as they are supposed to but little real progress has been 
accomplished. 
The transformation of ECOWAS is important because the making of the 
Moratorium was a direct result of this new way of thinking of regional cooperation in 
West Africa. In other words, the transformation brought some NRA ideas and thoughts 
about Transnationalism into ECOWAS for the first time. 
 
3.4 The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa 
Small arms and light weapons have been defined as “all crew-portable weapons 
and direct-fire weapons of a calibre less than 50mm and with a capacity against light 
armour and low flying aircrafts, including transport and fighter aircrafts”.119  
During the 1970s, military spending in Africa rose by more than 70% compared 
to the previous decade.120 The origin of these weapons was to a large extent the former 
Soviet Union, USA and their allies. Many of the weapons were sold or distributed to 
African countries as support to proxy wars in Africa during the Cold War era. For 
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instance, the weapons used by the Somali rebels against US troops in 1992 were for 
the most part supplied by the US government during previous years. While the West 
spent vast sums of money on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, 
Africa concentrated their military purchases on light weapons. These stockpiles of 
arms have later emerged as a major threat to security and development of the whole 
continent. But sadly, the distribution of arms from Western powers to Africa did not 
end along with the Cold War. There are proof of both governments (especially USA 
and France) and transnational companies supporting warring factions with both guns 
and money in several African conflicts during the 1990s.121 
Small arms do play a legitimate role in our society today as means of defence 
and security. However, their proliferation, meaning their excessive and destabilising 
accumulation and their widespread misuse has made them a serious source of 
concern.122 There are over 1100 companies from 98 countries producing SALW today 
and it is estimated that there are about 640 million small arms in circulation 
globally.123 Their easy use and transportation and their durability clearly results in their 
proliferation and long lasting use. West Africa is one of the areas of the world, which 
have felt the impact of small arms the strongest. The UN emphasised this in 2003: 
 
“(...) the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the phenomenon of  
mercenaries pose complex challenges to West Africa, involving security,  
humanitarian and development dimensions. The upsurge in intra-state conflicts  
and violence have created a staggering demand for small arms, and have contributed  
to the continued proliferation of bandits, rebel groups, mercenaries, uncontrolled  
police and militia in the entire sub-region.”124 
 
The widespread proliferation of SALW in West Africa has significantly 
contributed to the lethality and prolongation of armed conflicts in this region.125 Of the 
16 countries in West Africa, only one (Cape Verde) has managed to sustain a lasting 
and continued development from colonial rule to the present more or less democratic 
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governance situation without any outbreak of political violence. The estimates on how 
many lives have been lost in armed conflicts in the region during the last decade vary 
from 500.000 to 2 million.126 There can be no doubt about the links between the 
proliferation of SALW on the one hand and violence, armed conflict and non-conflict 
related armed criminal activity on the other. SALW are not the cause of conflicts but 
their proliferation has seriously exacerbated and sustained insecurities and tensions. 
Estimates on the amount of illegal weapons in circulation in West Africa vary 
considerably. Some say 7-10 million weapons127, others estimates10-20 million.128 
Nobody knows for certain. But either way, they do constitute a major factor in armed 
conflicts and the general security crisis in the region. Some of the consequences of 
their proliferation are destruction of lives, gross human rights violations, facilitation of 
bad governance, a general state of fear, insecurity, instability and the privatisation of 
security. The latter then further exacerbates the sub-regional SALW scourge.129 
Some West African leaders realised what a major concern the proliferation of 
SALW constituted in the region. They also realised that a regional approach to the 
incessant security problems was needed. In dealing with regional security, SALW has 
become an area of focus. The events leading up to the signing a Moratorium 
commenced in 1993.130 
 
3.5 Background for- and Making of the Moratorium 
Although most conflicts in West Africa have been intra-state conflicts, they 
cannot be viewed only in light of domestic issues. Important aspects are regional 
ethnic groups, regional armed groupings, cross border trade, historical ties across 
borders, management of natural resources and smuggling of both natural resources and 
weapons. Buzan has defined this regional security complex as a group of states so 
closely connected that security considerations of one regime cannot be seen isolated 
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from the security considerations of the other regimes.131 Through the revised treaty and 
a general change of thought, ECOWAS has begun to take this important aspect into 
account in their policy formulations. The Moratorium can be viewed in light of this. 
The initiative leading to the Moratorium came from President Konare of Mali in 
1993. The UN acted upon the initiative and established an advisory Mission, which 
during 1994-95 visited seven African countries. The conclusion was that the 
dissemination of SALW was a prerequisite for future development. In November 
1996, UNDP and UNIDIR convened a conference in Bamako on Conflict Prevention, 
Disarmament and Development in West Africa. Delegates from 12 West African 
countries participated along with ECOWAS delegates. The idea of a moratorium drew 
particular interest. During 1997, the respective governments of the West African 
states, the OAU and also the Wassenaar Arrangement were informed and briefed. 
They all took to the idea. Two other subsequent conferences, one in Yamoussoukro in 
March 1998 and the other in Oslo in April confirmed the commitment by ECOWAS 
member states to curbing the proliferation of SALW through declaring a moratorium. 
The proposed Moratorium was debated and approved along with a draft of the Code of 
Conduct in Banjul in July 1998.132 The Moratorium was declared in Abuja on 31 
October 1998 by all ECOWAS member states and Mauritania (which is not a member 
of ECOWAS).133  It came into force the next day, on 1 November, for a renewable 
period of three years. The signing of the Code of Conduct was delayed but it was 
signed on 10 December 1998 in Lomè.134 The Moratorium laid the foundation for a 
region-wide strategy on arms proliferation in particular and disarmament in general.135 
 
3.6 Implementing the Moratorium 
The implementation of the Moratorium is the responsibility of the individual 
member state. But ECOWAS has a responsibility regarding coordination, guidance, 
monitoring and raising resources. Connected to the Moratorium, there are two 
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important documents relating to the process of implementation. These are The Code of 
Conduct and The Plan of Action. I will briefly go through the main objectives in these 
two documents, starting with the Code of Conduct. 
 
3.6.1 The Code of Conduct 
Approved at the level of ECOWAS Heads of State, the Code of Conduct contains 
all the practical actions seen as necessary for the implementation of the Moratorium as 
well as concrete measures to be taken in order to reach the objectives laid out in the 
Moratorium.136 It consists of 17 articles. The most important of these are: 
• Institutional Arrangements such as National Commissions (NatComs) (4) and 
the ECOWAS Executive Secretary (5) 
• Administrative Mechanisms such as Information Exchange (6), Harmonisation 
of legislature (7) and Exemptions (9) 
• Operational Aspects such as Intra- and Inter-state Cooperation (11), Enhancing 
Border Controls (12) and Collection and Destruction of Surplus Weapons (13) 
• Promotion and Expansion measures such as Public Relations and Outreach 
(14), Resource Mobilisation (15), Dialogue with Suppliers and Producers (16) 
and Expansion of the Moratorium (17)137 
 
3.6.2 The Plan of Action 
Recognising the limited capacity of ECOWAS to fulfil the task of implementing 
the Moratorium, the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and 
Development (PCASED) was established by UNDP in March 1999 for an initial 
period of five years as an institutional arrangement meant to assist in the 
implementation process.138 It was, among other things, meant to temporarily replace 
and assist the National Commissions (NatComs), which was going to be established. 
There has been a mistaken general impression that PCASED is an implementing 
agency. However, PCASED was created to lend support to the implementation. The 
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primary responsibility for implementing the Moratorium rested upon the NatComs.139 
The establishment of NatComs has proceeded at a very slow pace. Many of them exist 
only on paper and therefore, the main responsibility for the implementation has been 
placed with PCASED even though that was not intended. The document presenting the 
guidelines for PCASED was the Plan of Action. It has nine priority areas: 
• Establishing a culture of peace; 
• Training programmes for military, security and police forces; 
• Enhancing weapons controls at border posts; 
• Establishment of a database and regional arms register; 
• Collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorized weapons; 
• Facilitating dialogue with producer/suppliers; 
• Review and harmonization of national legislation and administrative 
Procedures; 
• Mobilizing resources for PCASED objectives and activities; 
• Enlarging membership of the Moratorium140 
In March and June 2004 ECOWAS assessed and evaluated the record and progress of 
PCASED. The initial five-year period was over and one needed to decide on an 
approach for the future. The result was that UNDP proposed the establishment of an 
ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP). The hope is that ECOSAP 
shall provide technical and financial support to the NatComs and strengthen the 
capacity for implementation in the ECOWAS secretariat.141 Although PCASED is now 
officially transformed into ECOSAP, I will direct a lot of attention towards the Plan of 
Action and the work of PCASED because it has in practice, for five years been one of 
the two major arrangements concerning the implementation. It will therefore provide 
empirical background for evaluating the implementation according to my research 
question.  
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4. Analysing the Implementation 
Above I have shown that New Regionalism is the leading theoretical approach 
to regionalism today in general and also regarding West African regionalism. To sum 
up, I will go through the various aspects of the definition of regionalism by NRA 
presented by Hettne and Söderbaum and tie these aspects to West Africa.  
Looking at the definition, it initially states that regionalism is a comprehensive, 
multifaceted and multidimensional process. Although most of the initial goals of 
ECOWAS regionalism have not been reached142, regionalism and regionalisation have 
had an enormous impact on the region. The porous borders and the intertwined links 
between different groups of people and countries make the regional aspect an 
important one in West Africa. Some of the processes of regionalism and 
regionalisation are parts of more comprehensive and ideological plans, such as 
ECOWAS or NBA (Niger Basin Authority). Some are the result of people trying to 
enrich themselves by taking advantage of the present situation through smuggling or 
cross-border trading. Other processes are just the result of people trying to do their 
best to survive in a harsh environment of poverty and deprivation. This shows that 
regionalism and regionalisation in West Africa are, as the definition of Hettne and 
Söderbaum states, truly multidimensional and multifaceted. 
Next the definition states that the process implies the change of a region from 
relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity. The West African region is 
heterogeneous.143 But it is getting more homogenous. The close ties of francophonie 
are loosening up and cooperation in general is more comprehensive now than it used to 
be. A process of democratisation has commenced and both economic and political 
cooperation are given attention. It is fair to say that West Africa is not homogenous but 
it is moving in the direction of increased homogeneity. Looking at the African context, 
Daniel Bach states that “regionalisation in Africa proceeds essentially (...) from the 
expansive dynamics of trans-state networks which, depending on time and 
circumstances, can be associated with survival or accumulation, greed or bonds of 
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solidarity.”144 Relating to West Africa, the transnational networks are dominated by 
key figures in the region. Because of their importance, not only in the conduct of the 
transnational networks, but also in the political and economic spheres, these 
individuals deserve some attention. In order to understand the conduct of the networks, 
we need to understand the role of the persons who dominate them. The key figures can 
be political entrepreneurs or they may be warlords. Political entrepreneurs are men 
who are in a political powerful position, through which they have accumulated 
economic power and are using both power bases in order to be a dominant actor in 
transnational networks. Many of them have been Heads of State for long periods of 
time, such as Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo 
or Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso. This link between politics, economic power and 
Transnationalism is a common feature in the African Neo-patrimonial state.145 A 
definition of the term “warlord” states that the expression refers to “a leader of an 
armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, who can hold 
territory locally and, at the same time, act financially and politically in the 
international system without interference from the state in which he is based”146 They 
are backed by their military capacity and have either established own transnational 
networks or joined already established ones as a way of accumulating resources for 
financing their military endeavours or just for personal enrichment. Many warlords 
have tried to move up to become statesmen. Most have learnt that this transition is not 
an easy one, as the cases of Charles Taylor and Laurent Kabila have shown. The 
number of political leaders perceived as warlords has led to the expression 
warlordism147 being used to describe the political conduct of these individuals.  
As defined above, there are other transnational actors than state officials and 
warlords. NGOs and INGOs are also important actors. Transnationalism does not refer 
only to illegal networks smuggling weapons and drugs or informal border trading. This 
is only the informal part of Transnationalism. Bøås and Dokken have defined this as 
being network-based, situation-based and case-based cooperation. Formal 
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Transnationalism is defined as being led by non-state or state actors and also being 
institutionalised and hierarchical.148 Transnationalism is about all regular interactions 
where other actors than states are involved exclusively, or in cooperation with states. 
As mentioned earlier, what my research question implies is that if the 
Moratorium and its implementation is to be a success, the transnational relations so 
evidently influencing most aspects of the West African region, must be given due 
attention in the implementation. And this is an important point. This study will not 
seek to find a successful recipe for the implementation of the Moratorium. NRA is 
certainly not such a recipe. But I argue that the Moratorium must reflect some of the 
insights of the theories presented here because these theoretical frameworks describe 
characteristics inherent in the West African state and they need to be considered and 
given due attention. The legitimacy of such a claim is to be found in what I have 
outlined so far, through the presentation of NRA and the West African region. The 
African state is weak and therefore, it will easily be influenced by transnational actors 
such as private businessmen, warlords, or even individuals within the state itself.  
Before going into the main analysis I will direct attention to the different 
motives regarding stopping the proliferation of SALW. West African countries can be 
divided into three groups by their political situation. First we have the politically stable 
countries such as Cape Verde or Ghana. They see SALW in relation to violent crimes 
and most significantly, domestically speaking, they want to stop the proliferation as a 
part of stopping crime. The second group is post-conflict countries, which see the 
elimination of small arms as a key to avoiding renewed political violence.149 The third 
group consist of countries currently in conflict. They see SALW as a prolonging and 
fuelling factor in a conflict they hope to end. But they also see SALW as an important 
means to win the war. This is important to remember because the different role SALW 
play in West African societies and the different consequences of their proliferation will 
influence the motives, the will and the actions taken by each and every government. 
While a post-conflict country may focus on disarmament, a politically stable country 
may focus on policing.150 Even though this is a problem for the whole region and 
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region-wide strategies are needed, the impacts on the different countries will vary and 
so also the goals and the actions taken to obtain them. One needs to supplement the 
regional focus with a national focus.151 
 
4.1. The Demand for Arms in West Africa 
Before going into the core of the analysis I wish to properly establish both the 
demand for, and the supply of arms to West Africa. There is clearly a quite extensive 
demand for arms in West Africa. At present Africa is militarising. Where military 
budgets in almost all other regions are declining, they are getting larger in Africa.152 
The demand is divided between governments, insurgent groupings and individuals. 
Most weapons in Africa are actually in the hands of individuals. And much of what 
appears to drive this demand amongst individuals and rebel groups from a grievance 
perspective, is the frustration and desperation of citizens who are suffering under an 
inept, inattentive and often undemocratic state.153 Or as Louise have suggested: 
“Where states are unable to provide a secure environment for their citizens or meet the 
prerequisite demands of basic human needs, the proliferation of weaponry is both a 
principle consequence of, and a key contributor, to weak and ineffective 
governance.”154 But not all the demand for weapons can be explained from grievance. 
Greed is also a factor in this equation. Unlike the motives driven by grievance, the 
self-interested motives fuelling much of the demand extend beyond individual rebels 
and insurgent groups, and include governments as well.155  
After nearly 7 years it still seems clear that the states who signed the 
Moratorium do break the outlined terms of the agreement and they do take advantage 
of certain loopholes. And these loopholes are interesting. In the Code of Conduct there 
are outlined some exemption criteria. These criteria are mainly meant for national 
security, peacekeeping operations and for hunting and sporting purposes.156 Although 
one is supposed to request permission from the Executive Secretariat, the loopholes 
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have been widely misused. Member states, without seeking approval from ECOWAS, 
still import weapons when they feel the need to do so. In the cases where exemptions 
have been granted (which in 2001 applied to 10 cases) it has been for legitimate 
defence and security purposes.157 The major problem is all the other cases of 
importation. For instance, from 1999-2001 Ghana officially imported sporting and 
hunting shotguns for over US$ 5.8 mill.158 Although there might be some game 
hunting going on in Ghana, or farmers acquiring shotguns for protection of their 
livestock and crops, it is doubtful whether all those shotguns have been used 
exclusively for “hunting and sporting purposes” or “national security”. Due to the 
price of imported guns compared to locally produced guns159 it is likely that not many 
ordinary people can afford to buy imported guns of this kind knowing that artisan 
produced guns are significantly cheaper and in many cases, easier to obtain. And this 
is not an isolated incident. There are many others as well. In the same period, Guinea 
imported shotgun cartridges for US$ 4.7 million.160 These numbers are only the 
official import. Just looking at the official statistics one can actually see that all 16 
countries, which signed the Moratorium, has imported weapons after the declaration 
was signed.161 I am not implying that all these weapons necessarily end up as illegal 
weapons flowing around Africa and fuelling conflicts, but there is definitely a 
significant chance that some of them, at some point in time, will. 
 
4.2. The Supply of Arms to West Africa 
In order for West African countries to buy weapons, there must be somebody 
selling them. Therefore, the suppliers deserve some attention here. There are two kinds 
of arms trade: legal and illegal trade. The illegal trade is often portrayed as the root of 
the small arms crisis, but this is not necessarily completely correct. The reason being 
that most illegal small arms started up as legal. They can be stolen, captured, or come 
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from governments disposing of surplus arms.162 For this reason it is of importance to 
not only focus on the illegal trading but also on the legal part.  
The only significant arms producing country in Sub-Saharan Africa is South 
Africa. The total percentage of global weapons producers found in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is only 3%.163 Therefore, most of the attention given to suppliers must be directed 
towards actors outside Africa, and for the most part towards countries in the developed 
world. But also countries such as China and some Middle Eastern countries contribute 
to the supply of small arms. I am not saying that weapons are not produced all over 
Africa. Countries such as Nigeria do manufacture weapons but the scale of production 
is small compared to the Western world. Some countries deserve special attention 
regarding the supply of arms to West Africa. France is one such country. In 1999-2001 
France officially exported weapons to West Africa for the total amount of over US$ 
8.3 million. And there were no sign of significantly decreasing numbers during that 
period. Spain had an even higher figure. They exported for almost US$ 10.2 million in 
the same period. They actually increased their export by 78% from 2000 to 2001.164 
The availability of arms for official import into West Africa should now be properly 
established. Although these figures might not bring about much optimism, there are 
some cases showing a different development. United Kingdom decreased their export 
to West Africa from US$ 6.1 million in 1993 to only US$ 2300 in 2001.165 
As mentioned above, all West African countries have during the years of the 
Moratorium officially bought weapons. The top four suppliers to West Africa; USA, 
Britain, France and Spain,166 are all members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.167 The 
Wassenaar Arrangement was consulted in the making of the Moratorium and has 
openly supported it from its beginning to the present, practically meaning that all the 
member states of Wassenaar support the Moratorium. All arms transfers from these 
countries have been approved by the respective governments. In other words, there are 
obvious dualities in the actions of these powerful nations. In December 2002 the 33 
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member states of Wassenaar approved a document setting out non-binding guidelines 
for exporting SALW. In this document, the arrangement calls upon the members to 
subject small arms to national export controls. One of the measures that the member 
states are encouraged to take when considering a possible export is to consider the 
importing country’s compliance record with arms control and non-proliferation 
agreements. Other considerations include whether the potential buyer can afford the 
weaponry, whether it has a legitimate need for such arms, and its record concerning 
human rights. Further, exports should be avoided if Wassenaar member states believe 
a risk exists that the weapons could end up in the hands of terrorists or organized 
crime. The member states should also not approve exports if the arms could prolong or 
aggravate an ongoing conflict or if they could be diverted to another country.168 It is 
safe to say that not all the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement have taken these 
encouragements into account when exporting SALW to West Africa.  
Up until now I have established that there is both a demand for and a supply of 
arms in West Africa. Next I will analyse the implementation process through the 
theoretical lenses of NRA and its central aspects such as Transnationalism and theories 
of the African state previously presented. In doing so I will first look at the areas 
where the implementation process does reflect the central aspects of New Regionalism 
such as Transnationalism and Neo-patrimonialism. Then I will present areas where it 
does not. Thirdly, I will look at whether the theories are sufficient or not. Are there 
aspects of the implementation process which is not possible to relate to these theories? 
 
4.3. A Match between Theory and Implementation  
In the implementation documents of the Moratorium there are mainly two areas 
where the central aspects of NRA are reflected. These are (1) the effort made in 
relation to (it might not be primarily aimed at this but can potentially have an effect 
on) establishing a culture of peace and (2) the measures taken to address the weakness 
of the state in West Africa. I will now go deeper into these to aspects. 
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4.3.1. A Culture of Peace as a Goal of Formal Regionalism 
There are mainly four ways of stopping illegal arms trade, you can either 
remove the traders’ will to trade, you can take measures to remove their possibility to 
trade, you can stop them by taking away the their ability to trade or you can take 
measures to remove the demand for arms. 
The first priority area of PCASED addresses the traders will to trade and the 
demand for arms. That is establishing a culture of peace. PCASED states that “[…] 
appropriate programmes must be put in place to counter the growing culture of 
violence.”169 Their plan for doing so is by education and enlightenment.170 This will 
take time and even then it is such a difficult task that it will demand a will and 
commitment, which doubtfully is present today. But the establishment of a culture of 
peace is in line with the goal of formal regionalism, namely socio-economic 
development which again is preconditioned by regional peace and security.171 NRA 
attempts to describe both formal and informal regionalisation and connect them. But 
when discussing the goal of regionalism one has to separate the two. It would be 
wrong to say that a culture of peace is the goal of NRA because the informal part of 
regionalism does not have this uniform goal. Formal regionalism, however, do state 
that regional schemes will hopefully lead to peaceful relations between the integrating 
parties and also socio-economic development.  
Other aspects of establishing a culture of peace includes for instance 
democratisation, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, which would seriously 
reduce the demand for arms. These are also areas where ECOWAS is involved for 
instance with ECOMOG but also through AU and NEPAD172 and their plans and 
projects concerning democratisation. One example is the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM)173. ECOMOG was founded as a more or less ad hoc force meant 
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to stop the civil war in Liberia but has since then been institutionalised as the 
Peacekeeping force of ECOWAS.174 The APRM has basically been hampered by lack 
of commitment175 and a review board where at least 6 out of 7 members have past 
links to non-democratic regimes and/or corruption charges.176 None of these other 
aspects of establishing a culture of peace are mentioned in any document related to the 
Moratorium. The Plan of Action is exclusively focusing on education and 
enlightenment as means to establishing a culture of peace. I will not go further into a 
discussion on these initiatives here besides mentioning their importance concerning 
establishing a culture of peace in West Africa and on the African continent. In this part 
of the implementation the goal is coherent with the formal part of NRA and formal 
regionalism in general although the means for achieving that goal might not be. 
 
4.3.2. Weak States Facilitates the Existence of Transnational Networks 
The area where the implementation of the Moratorium is most coherent with the 
theories is institution building. Even though the Moratorium is aiming at institution 
building it is important to remember that in their effort, ECOWAS has a tendency to 
presuppose a degree of transparency that does not exist. And transparency is needed if 
the institution building is going to succeed at a regional level. The lack of transparency 
is an issue that needs to be addressed because as long as there is not enough 
transparency in the West African region, the states will remain weak with a low degree 
of institutionalisation. This is not to say that transparency alone will fix the problem of 
state weakness but it is one factor that needs to be solved.177  
As mentioned above, Dokken states that “the weakness of the state facilitates 
the growth of informal networks, and these networks are by nature trans-national.”178 
Consistent with this, Bach argues that African regionalisation has proceeded mainly 
from interactions initiated by non-state actors faced with decaying states, unable or 
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unwilling to assert their sovereignty.179 One feature of a weak state is a flourishing 
informal economy. And common people do not participate in the informal economy 
out of choice. They do so because they have to in order to survive the everyday 
struggle to cover basic needs. As Bach stated, “farmers participate in the second 
economy out of desperation rather than choice.”180 The informal economy can be an 
attractive place for farmers to sell their crops, it can create an earning opportunity for 
women forced to earn money because their husband’s salaries are not enough to live 
on or when salaries in the public sector remain unpaid.181 In other words, when the 
state proves unable to fulfil its duties in relation to its population and do not provide 
them with their basic needs, people will resort to any other opportunity available to 
them. And the informal economy is such an opportunity, either it be in small scale 
dealing of commodities or in more serious dealings in arms or other illegal 
merchandise. Desperate people deprived of basic needs are easy targets for 
transnational networks in need of “foot soldiers”.  
It is a common belief that Africa is moving in the direction of increased 
formalisation and institutionalisation, but as Chabal & Daloz argues, it is more likely 
that Africa is moving towards increased informalisation.182 The African state is weak. 
Following the argumentation of Chabal and Daloz, the way to emerge out of this 
weakness and into a modern state is the emancipation of the institutions from society 
and then the constitution of autonomous political institutions. This will mean the end 
of patrimonialism.183 The private and the public spheres are then separated. 
There are several steps taken to build stronger institutions emancipated from 
society in West Africa.. Whether it is enough is another issue. Four out of nine 
PCASED priority areas can be related to institution building and strengthening of the 
state. Those are: (1) training security forces; (2) enhancing weapons controls at border 
posts; (3) the establishment of arms registers and; (4) reviewing and harmonising 
national legislation and administrative procedures.184 These issues are also given 
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attention in the Code of Conduct under the presentation of Institutional Arrangements 
and Administrative Mechanisms.185 The first two of these four initiatives are directed 
at the illegal trade and smuggling and are aiming at decreasing the possibility of illegal 
cross-border arms trade. These are also directed at one of the most important groups of 
transnational actors in weapons trade, namely the illegal networks conducting large-
scale arms trafficking. The problem is that most African borders are not demarcated on 
the ground, there are only a few border posts and many borders exist only as frontiers, 
not as “real” borders.186 Illegal traders have many other options than to pass over those 
few border posts. Even if security forces are better trained and arms controls at border 
posts are enhanced, it will only stop a part of the smuggling. It might make it a bit 
more difficult for the smugglers, but it will definitely not stop them.  
In reference to the arguments of Chabal and Daloz, this must still be recognised 
as a step in the right direction towards building stronger institutions. These institutions 
can then possibly be emancipated from society and not be influenced by the private 
sphere to the same extent as they are today. Corruption in both police and security 
forces is not uncommon and building a stronger and better force, together with other 
measures, might help to decrease this problem. But this must be done while also 
specifically addressing the culture of corruption because if not, a stronger force will 
only be more able to be corrupt. Stronger institutions are necessary in order to fully 
succeed in implementing the Moratorium. The problem with the institution building 
process is that it has continued at a very slow pace.187 There might also be a 
discrepancy between the stated goal and what is realistically obtainable and really 
wanted by those who are supposed to implement it. Due to very limited resources, both 
regarding finances and personnel, controlling tremendously long borders in an often 
inhospitable environment might not a realistic goal for West African states today. 
An issue not specifically mentioned in the Plan of Action, is the fact that a lot of 
weapons flow into West Africa from the sea.188 The majority of West African ports do 
not have a system for registering ships coming in and therefore no way of controlling 
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the shipments.189 Also, there is no coast guard present to control those unloading at 
sea. It is not a difficult task along the West African coast to transport shipments close 
to shore, unload into smaller boats and then bring the goods to shore and transport it to 
their final destinations without being questioned by any official authority. 
Progress on the last two of the four initiatives mentioned has proceeded slowly. 
Establishing an arms register is costly. Financing the project and finding an 
appropriate approach is problematic.190 Reviewing the legislation commenced in 2001 
but it has been a problem to convince member states to adapt their national legislation 
to the proposed regional law.191 The definition of NRA which I have used describes a 
development leading from general heterogeneity to increased homogeneity. 
Harmonisation of legislation is exactly such a step towards increased homogeneity 
across the region. For PCASED’s credit, they have taken the issue of legislation 
seriously. In a document of 2003 they state that: 
 
“Many West African states are governed by laws that were elaborated during the  
colonial era, and operate under legal regimes that no longer reflect  adequately the  
security situation and socio-political environment of these countries. Furthermore,  
what may exist by way of laws and regulations, do not often take into account light  
weapons possession and use by civilians, or small arms ammunition import and  
export. Consequently, the difference between legal and illegal transfers of small  
arms and light weapons is often hard to establish in the sub-region.”192 
 
The factor preventing reviewing and harmonisation of legislation is first and 
foremost political will. There might be several motives for this lack of political will. 
One likely reason is the overall reluctance shown by almost all African states to 
surrender any kind of sovereignty to a higher authority. Being told to review and 
implement laws on behalf of ECOWAS might be perceived by some West African 
leaders as a “violation” of their national sovereignty although no supranational 
authority or the establishment of such is involved. One can also not overlook the fact 
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that the lack of administrative and economic resources needed for such a review might 
be an additionally important factor slowing the process down. 
In addition to the four measures mentioned in the Plan of Action, the Code of 
Conduct presents the establishment of another institutional arrangement, the 
NatComs.193 They are made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and civil 
society.194 Including civil society in policy formation is an area where African states 
have fallen behind but it is also an area, which has been given quite a lot of attention 
lately. The number of NGOs in Africa is growing. One reason for this is that foreign 
aid is increasingly being channelled through NGOs instead of being given directly to 
governments.195 The problem regarding the NatComs was that their establishment 
proceeded very slowly. By 2001 only 9 of the 16 countries had established 
NatComs.196 But by January 2005 all states except Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire had 
fulfilled this task.197 One country reluctant to establish a NatCom was Cape Verde. 
They preferred to use an already existing committee of security matters.198 The reason 
for this may be related to the fact that they do not have any significant small arms 
proliferation compared to the rest of West Africa. As mentioned, the situation of the 
single country will influence its political will and the steps taken even though this is 
mainly a regional project. The reluctance shown by Cape Verde in this area illustrates 
that point. However, many of the commissions established are suffering from weak 
capacity and lack of funds and political support. The tasks fulfilled by PCASED was 
supposed to be transferred to the NatComs as soon as these were established but 
instead, the member states have used PCASED as an excuse for not forming NatComs. 
And even if established they are not capable of fulfilling the tasks they have been 
supposed to fulfil due to lack of resources and political support. The latest 
development in this area is that PCASED has been taken out of action as its five year 
period came to an end in 2004 and the successor, ECOSAP, has been established as a 
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result of an UNDP proposal.199 The hope of the UNDP is that ECOSAP will provide 
the technical and financial support to the NatComs and strengthen the capacity for 
implementation in the ECOWAS secretariat, which PCASED has not managed.200 I 
will not direct any more focus towards ECOSAP due to the fact that it is too early to 
cast any judgement over this arrangement.  
 
4.4. Areas where the Implementation does not reflect the Central Aspects of 
NRA 
In the following I will focus on four areas where I believe that the process of 
implementation does not properly reflect central aspects of NRA. These four are: (1) 
the operations of transnational networks; (2) the handling of end-user certificates; (3) 
artisan production and; (4) the top-down strategies adopted by ECOWAS. 
 
4.4.1. The Operations of Transnational Networks 
There are several areas with a discrepancy between the insights presented by 
NRA and the way in which the Moratorium is implemented. This especially relates to 
addressing the operations of the transnational networks. If the arms flow into West 
Africa is to be stopped, measures must be taken against the transnational networks 
conducting the illegal trade. As the Small Arms Survey points out, “embargoed 
governments and insurgent movements are so numerous that they create a market for 
illicit weapons possibly rivalling the scale of legal demand.”201 West African 
governments are not only a part of the demand side but also the supply side. Although 
all governments certainly will deny being involved, they do contribute to the supply of 
SALW. Greene states about governments in general that “it is an open secret that 
many governments are deeply implicated in much of the illicit arms trade, either by 
facilitating covert supply to proxies and allies or by turning a “blind eye” to the 
diversion into the black market of legal arms transfers from or through their 
territory.”202 The ECOWAS Moratorium has had very limited effect on the criminal 
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transnational arms networks currently operating and thriving in West Africa.203 There 
are different actors involved in these groups. At the top you have a small group of 
individuals leading the transnational networks. These are people with extensive 
resources and with many contacts and intermediaries. They can be statesmen, 
businessmen and/or warlords.204 Charles Taylor is one West African example. The 
RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, is another. Different ECOMOG generals and leading 
officers have also been heavily accused of supplying weapons to whoever willing to 
pay the asking price. Common to all of them are their resources and their place high up 
in the hierarchical web of patron-client relationships, which gives them influence over 
large masses of people and political processes all over the region. These men 
cooperate with the arms brokers. The majority of weapons coming illegally into West 
Africa come through the dealings of Eastern European arms agents. They have gained 
access to for instance surplus arms from the former Soviet Union, stolen weapons, 
arms bought from corrupt governments or actually also legal arms from legitimate 
producers.205 It is important to notice that arms brokering is in itself not an illegal act 
in most states. As IANSA has stated: 
 
“Arms brokering may be understood as activities such as negotiating, arranging  
or otherwise facilitating the transfers of weapons that are neither necessarily in the  
ownership of the broker, nor necessarily originate in the country from which the  
broker operates. Such brokering activities are a legitimate and often integral part of  
the international arms trade. However, there is a significant lack of regulation on  
brokering activities which makes it very difficult to distinguish between legitimate  
and illicit activities. Moreover, unscrupulous brokers have ruthlessly exploited the  
current lack of controls to facilitate arms transfers to regions of instability and  
governments and rebel groups under international arms embargoes.”206 
 
These agents operating in the illegal market that need to be stopped. But by 2000, only 
six countries in the world had taken official measures targeted at controlling arms 
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brokers.207 The last major group is the transportation agents, some transporting goods 
through air, some over land and some at sea. These people are not necessarily people 
who are dealing exclusively in arms trade, but rather agents who are willing to do 
business with whoever willing to pay for it. Transporting arms is good business for 
them. Some do it for the good profits while others do it more out of necessity as a 
general survival strategy. There are a significant number of Russian pilots who left the 
former Soviet Union with old Russian built aircrafts now operating small air 
transportation businesses across Africa transporting everything from food to arms.  
A wide range of different actors loosely organised is typical of transnational 
trafficking networks. And this makes it an enormous challenge for ECOWAS member 
states to try to unravel, control and stop them, even if they truly had wanted to. But 
still, it would be possible for ECOWAS and the West African states to launch actions 
aimed at limiting their dealings. At present, there are no such actions mentioned in the 
implementation process of the Moratorium. The only measure taken is better policing 
and customs and border controls. Of course, that can help but it is not enough to have a 
serious impact on the trade conducted by these networks. One way of approaching the 
problem is to look at the way in which these networks finance the trade and then take 
measures to block their finances. As an example we can look to Liberia. Liberia’s 
timber industry is the main building block for their extensive arms trafficking. The 
illicit arms trade in Liberia would be severely limited without the funds and logistics 
from the timber industry.208 The illegal trading networks in Liberia consist of four 
main transnational actors: the Liberian government, the timber industry, the 
international buyers (of timber and also of diamonds) and the arms suppliers. The 
heydays of this trade were under the regime of Charles Taylor, the same person who 
willingly signed the Moratorium in October 1998. Concerning diamonds, all trade was 
illegal due to international embargoes but concerning timber the trade was both legal 
and illegal. In 2002, Liberia officially sold timber for US$152 million.209 But this is 
most likely not the whole amount of the trade since there has been found evidence of 
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illegal trade in timber from Liberia to for instance China.210 Payments from timber and 
diamonds to Charles Taylor happened frequently, money which he then used to buy 
weapons exclusively on the illicit market, because there was an arms embargo on 
Liberia. Often he bought the weapons from contacts in Eastern Europe and imported 
them through a third country such as Libya and/or Nigeria.211  
The state in Liberia is among the weakest and most fragmented in Africa. It has 
been characterised as a failed state and also been said to have become a de facto 
UNMIL trusteeship.212 As previously mentioned, such a situation will facilitate the 
existence of transnational networks. Risse-Kappen has also divided transnational 
actors into two groups according to motives. One economically and one 
ideologically/politically motivated. The case of Charles Taylor is a clear example of an 
economically motivated transnational actor although he has portrayed himself as 
mainly ideologically motivated. The previously mentioned argument by Krasner 
saying that transnational actors will only exist in a system in which there are multiple 
centres of political authority213 also applies here. The political authority of Liberia is 
severely divided between different political actors and warlords. 
It is of course not an easy task to block the finances of the trading networks but 
there are some measures, which can be taken. The Swiss banks, for instance, have 
been a popular hiding place for enormous sums of money stolen by corrupt African 
rulers. These banks have been, and still are, quite reluctant to cooperate in recovering 
these funds in order to transfer them back to their rightful owners. Some accounts have 
been emptied and the money transferred back to the country they were stolen from. 
But by all likely estimations, this is but a small percentage of the total amount of funds 
stolen from the state or profited from illegal trade and then hidden away in foreign 
banks. More focus and severe actions taken against corruption is another measure, 
which can be taken. Corruption is vividly present all the way to the top of the 
government in most African countries and it gives corrupt rulers the funds for illegal 
arms purchases. Corruption is a part of Neo-patrimonialism through the mixing of the 
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private and the public spheres. In the implementation documents there are no measures 
focusing on the traders’ ability to trade. It is commonly known that the natural 
resources of the region is widely used to buy arms but the only step taken to stop this 
is international embargoes, which has obviously not succeeded. Embargoes rather 
build up incentives for the growth of illicit trading. Transnational networks are not 
only involved in bringing goods such as arms into West Africa. They are as much 
involved in bringing important natural resources out of the region. And the money is 
used, among other things, to buy arms. As many other aspects of Transnationalism 
regarding arms trade, the issue of finances is completely ignored in the Moratorium. 
The main concern of many African rulers is regime security. The preservation 
of the regime is often the leading motive behind both domestic and foreign policy.214 
Although it might not be the case regarding Charles Taylor, I do not doubt that most 
West African Heads of State who signed the Moratorium sincerely felt, and still feels, 
that stopping the arms proliferation in West Africa would be a tremendous 
achievement on the road to peace and development in the region, which they all want 
for their respective countries. But this goal is too often sacrificed on the alter of self 
preservation. West African politics can be contradictory, but it is in no way irrational 
in it own context. When two or more interests or commitments contradict each other, 
history has shown that most African leaders will choose the path most in line with 
regime security, almost regardless of the consequences for the people or the country as 
a whole. The notion of regime security is actually one of the most important 
contributions of non-positivist realism to the study of African politics.215 Of course, 
one can find this trend outside Africa as well, but it is more dominant and more 
comprehensive in the African environment than most other places. This can also 
clearly be linked up to several theories about the African state. As Chabal and Daloz 
have stated; ideology has been of secondary importance for African rulers. The logic 
of politics has commonly been driven by the need to acquire the patrimonial means of 
one’s political legitimacy.216 
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Regarding the case of arms purchases such as the ones committed by Charles 
Taylor, one could ask why ECOWAS has done so little to stop it. They must have 
known what was, and probably still is, going on, not only in Liberia but many other 
places in the region as well. In this case you had the Liberian state as a transnational 
actor not only deeply involved, but actually controlling and pushing a transnational 
network illegally importing weapons into West Africa. Weapons that have probably 
been used at least in the armed conflicts in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire and 
probably now on their way to make their contribution in the next armed conflict in 
West Africa. For instance, guns used in both Liberia and Sierra Leone have lately been 
used in armed uprisings in Nigeria.217 The illegal arms trading into Liberia was a 
typical example of Neo-patrimonialism. Charles Taylor used his position, his contacts 
and his government to fulfil his personal goals. State funds and state offices were 
widely used for this purpose. This example shows the duality and the contradictions of 
the West African state and of the West African political leader generally presented in 
theories on the African state as well as in NRA. The same president both signed the 
Moratorium and at the same time being one of its main perpetrators. 
Another question is whether ECOWAS has ever had the resources to do 
something about this. ECOWAS is not a strong organisation either institutionally, or 
financially. There have been, and still are serious problem areas in the organisation, as 
I discussed in the previous chapter. ECOWAS is not a supranational body, thus not 
holding any authority over member states. This leads to one of the main critiques 
directed at the Moratorium, that it is not a convention and thereby not legally binding 
and thereby not giving ECOWAS any options to put force behind the demands for 
cooperation from the member states. But even if it was a convention, the question is 
what kind of sanctions could and should be incorporated into such a convention. This 
is a question I will come back to at the end of this study. 
Liberia under Charles Taylor is not the only one who has violated the 
Moratorium. Another country, which has vividly involved itself in arms trafficking 
and in the Liberian conflict, is Guinea. A number of sources, among them Human 
Rights Watch, have argued that the Guinean Ministry of Defence has used a private 
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Guinean mining and trading company, Katex Mine, as a broker for military 
procurement. These weapons are said to have ended up in the hands of LURD 
(Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy). Several flights, chartered by the 
Guinean Ministry of Defence, went from Teheran to Conakry in Guinea by a 
Ukrainian airline company in 2002 and 2003. For instance, seven cargo flights from 
Iran arrived between the 5th and 17th of March 2003218. The waybills of these flights 
stated that they included various cargoes including over 1000 pieces of “technical 
equipment” and 2500 pieces of “detergent”. These flights preceded by a few weeks a 
major LURD offensive.219 And this is only one of many examples of possible Guinean 
military aid to LURD. Of course, this has not been 100% proven but between the 
circumstantial evidences such as the suspicious nature of these flights, LURD officials 
admitting to have received aid from Guinea, US officials stating to have prove of the 
same and Iranian weapons found inside Liberia220, one can only draw one conclusion. 
Another interesting aspect of this is the fact that Guinea is, and has been for quite 
some time, a recipient of US military aid. Although knowing what was going on, the 
US did not stop the military aid to Guinea. According to US officials, they instead 
adopted the tactics of so-called quiet diplomacy. Some have then argued that, not only 
did the US ignore the actions of Guinea under the disguise of quiet diplomacy, but 
they also silently supported it as a way of getting Charles Taylor out of Monrovia.221 
Again, this is an example of the contradictions in state actions, and not only on the side 
of Guinea, but also the US. As I mentioned above, Grant and Söderbaum have argued 
that there are multiple actors in both the African state and in society, which are linked 
together in hybrid networks and coalitions, together creating a whole range of complex 
regionalism processes. And the fact that they do so is a response to their political, 
economic and social needs.222 The Guinean state acted in the way they did exactly as a 
response to their needs without much consideration of its commitments regarding the 
Moratorium. And in this case, the US did the same. This trend which is so common in 
the African state is important to understand because one has to realise that what is 
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happening in Africa is not the absence of politics, as some have argued, but it is rather 
politics practised in a complex way that might seem irrational to the ways of 
explaining political actions in traditional IR theory. 223 There are obviously many 
motives behind this cooperation between LURD and the Guinean government but as a 
transnational actor in West Africa, LURD has accomplished what Risse-Kappen has 
stated to be the precondition for transnational actors in order to affect state policies. As 
mentioned above, that is to overcome two obstacles. They must gain access to the 
political system and they must generate or contribute to “winning” policy coalitions.224 
LURD has gained access to the Guinean state and they have brought something to the 
table, which was seen as valuable to the Guinean government. And then, one more 
transnational relation was established, not based on any sort of ideology but as a 
loosely connected ad hoc partnership born out of the recognition that cooperation 
could help them accomplish common goals. 
 
4.4.2. End-User Certificates (EUCs) 
Above I presented some examples of attempts under the implementation of the 
Moratorium of state strengthening and institution building. This will according to 
theory limit the possibilities for informal transnational networks. There has been made 
some progress in this area. But one institution building measure which has not been 
given much attention in the implementation process is the control over arms flows that 
the state can obtain by building a stronger and more comprehensive system of end-user 
certificates.225 The misuse of such certificates has been flourishing. As for the 
previously mentioned example from Guinea, while the Guinean Ministry of Defence 
maintained that Katex was the government agent for the import of agricultural supplies 
for the army’s rice plantations, Human Rights Watch obtained an EUC issued by the 
Ministry of Defence for Katex Mine to obtain weapons.226  
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EUCs, if not misused, are clearly an important issue in stopping the arms 
proliferation. They are supposed to guarantee the final destination of weapons but “in 
effect they are just weapons shopping lists on official letterhead”.227 EUCs have 
become merchandise that the issuing authority can provide for other countries under 
weapons embargoes such as Liberia, or for rebels, insurgents or warlords. It has been 
proven by the UN that in the summer of 2002, eight different EUCs, all from 
ECOWAS member states, were used to import over 210 tons of arms into Liberia.228 
From where these certificates came is not known, but they must have come directly 
from some state officials in several ECOWAS countries or they have been forged. This 
importation was of course in violation not only of the Moratorium but also the arms 
embargo on Liberia. And there are many more such examples of EUCs being misused.  
When persons within the government bring such certificates onto the black 
market, it is a perfect example of the corruption vividly present in the neo-patrimonial 
system in Africa. This is not to say that corruption necessarily is an inherent part of a 
neo-patrimonial state but most cases show that it is present in such states. Chabal and 
Daloz describe it as a means through which patrimonialism is practised.229 When 
corruption is becoming that common, it is also gaining a sort of legitimacy in the 
minds of people. Then the moral threshold for taking part in these illegal acts is 
becoming even lower. But one cannot overlook the fact that many act in corrupt 
manners more out of desperation than out of greed. Salaries from employers, 
especially the government, tend to remain unpaid. People in the lower ranks of the 
system which are desperate to support their families cannot afford the moral stance 
against “unofficial payments”. They will take the opportunities they see for supporting 
their family. But not all misused EUCs come from unfaithful servants in the state 
system. There is currently no reliable international system to check the originality of 
these documents.230 This means that the likelihood of false documents being in 
circulation, in addition to the illegitimate documents, is definitely present. 
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On the matter concerning the suppliers, there is a grey area in the process of 
granting exemptions from the Moratorium. The suppliers do not have to seek 
permission from ECOWAS in order to sell weapons to West African countries. This is 
an obvious flaw. As mentioned, ECOWAS do issue some exemptions when arms 
purchases are proved to be legitimate but those who have been given such permission 
do not have to show the documents when purchasing the weapons.231 This is also a 
flaw which may lead to illegitimate purchases being disguised by the buyers as 
legitimate. One can only speculate to what the reasons for these obvious flaws might 
be because it would not demand much coordination or funds to correct them. It might 
though, be fair to say that it is quite convenient for Western arms manufacturers to be 
made completely non-responsible if and when they supply weapons to West African 
states in a way that violates the Moratorium and the recommended considerations 
issued by the Wassenaar Arrangement. And this system is also convenient for those 
transnational actors on the demand side who have access to political power. The 
weapons manufacturers are a powerful actor both in business and in politics. There are 
huge sums of money to be made on weapons production and weapons sales. The 
interests vested in this business are huge and those who stand to loose if the exports 
were to be cut, are doing what they can to avoid such losses. It is then clear that the 
producers and exporters are an important transnational actor in the arms proliferation 
of West Africa. And with their resources they are able to influence state policies and 
by doing so, ensuring continued export to West Africa.232 
 
4.4.3. Production from Below: Artisan Production 
When working on the Moratorium it is important to realise that not all arms in 
West Africa have come from outside the region. Production within the region is also a 
part of the Moratorium and local production is clearly a part of the arms proliferation 
problem. Sowatey has estimated that about 100,000 guns are produced annually in 
Ghana alone.233 Most of them are made by local blacksmiths or other competent 
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people in the region trying to make the best possible living for themselves and their 
families in a harsh environment. Others are saying that artisan production of arms is 
largely insignificant due to the fact that the vast majority of the weapons in West 
Africa are imported.234 But I will still include artisan production because the 
Moratorium declaration specifically says that it is a Moratorium on importation, 
exportation and manufacture. Therefore, I believe that all aspects of the Moratorium, 
including production, needs to be dealt with, not only the importation and exportation 
part of the problem. Although these weapons might not be a huge and important factor 
in most West African armed conflicts, they are without a doubt being used extensively 
in gun-related crimes, which significantly contributes to the general situation of 
insecurity inflicted upon ordinary people in the region. And if and when the 
importation of arms will decrease, the demand for locally produced arms will grow. 
Artisan production of guns is not a new phenomenon in West Africa. Using the 
Ghanaian case as an example, Oppong argues that an iron specialist in former times 
produced weapons such as knives and spears and later guns and bullets for chiefs 
among certain ethnic groups.235 Under colonial rule, local gun production was banned. 
In order to protect themselves, the colonisers did not want the colonised to be armed in 
any way. This ban was carried over into the post-colonial period. But the tradition and 
skills of artisan production did not disappear.236 The reasons for this are both cultural 
and economic. Long traditions and the status of owing a gun, are important to a large 
part of the rural population especially. Locally produced guns are much cheaper than 
imported ones. It is also good business for the artisan because the demand for guns is 
much higher than the demand for other iron works such as agricultural tools. Some 
locally produced guns in Ghana are also being illegally exported through transnational 
trade to neighbouring countries. There have been occasions where some manufacturers 
have been invited by groups with hidden identity in Côte d’lvoire to produce guns in 
that country. Knowing then the present situation of uncertainty in Côte d’Ivoire, one 
can easily imagine what these guns are planned to be used for.237 
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Artisan production in Ghana has increased over the last decade. Rising living 
costs and rising demands tempt more people into acquiring these skills and to produce 
as much as possible and also produce more sophisticated guns. These guns are at an 
increasing rate ending up in the hands of criminal networks and are now being used 
more frequently in violent conflicts all over West Africa. But still, there is no 
mentioning of artisan production in the implementation of the Moratorium. The United 
Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) has started 
an initiative called Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa 
(SATCRA).238 In this document, dealing with problems related to artisan production is 
mentioned. Their plan for dealing with the issue consists of assisting states in 
conducting a survey and establishing an inventory of local SALW producers. It would 
be natural for ECOWAS to get involved in this and to integrate it into the 
implementation of the Moratorium. But this has not happened, at least not yet. 
Sowatey argues that there are two mutually reinforcing options for dealing with 
artisan production of arms: the legalisation of gun production as a way of marking and 
tracing; and diverting the gun making skills of the producers to the production of 
peaceful tools that the artisans already have the capacity to produce.239  
As in most aspects of ECOWAS cooperation, a top-down approach has been 
adopted. Regarding the Moratorium, the lowest level of production is ignored. NRA 
focuses on regionalism from below because it attempts to involve the spontaneous and 
informal processes, which often emerge from below and are not a product of decisions 
made on the top. The implementation process has not directed any focus towards the 
processes of arms production from below. This leads me over to my next point, the 
top-down approach adopted by ECOWAS in their information strategies. 
 
4.4.4. Regionalism from Below Related to ECOWAS Top-Down Information 
Strategies 
Both the Plan of Action and the Code of Conduct mentions information, PR and 
promotion as areas of priority. The main rationale for this is to mobilise resources and 
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enlarge the membership of the Moratorium. The fact that these motives are forming 
the basis for the information strategies is reflected in the way in which information has 
been spread. ECOWAS has directed their main focus outwards towards possible 
donors in the Western world, towards possible partners such as IGOs or NGOs and 
towards other regional or continental organisations in Africa. This is by all means an 
understandable strategy due to the Moratorium’s complete dependency on external aid 
and support. The problem with this strategy is that it is almost exclusively directed 
outwards. No major information campaign has been directed at the people of West 
Africa. A report of the Experts’ Meeting and Civil Society Meeting in March 1999 
stated that although it was then five months since the Moratorium was signed, few 
people other than specialists were aware of its existence.240 It has been estimated that 
79% of all small arms in Sub-Saharan Africa are in the hands of civilians, while only 
2% are in the hands of insurgents (the remaining 19% are estimated to be in the hands 
of different state institutions such as police and military).241 In light of this it seems 
evident to me that it would be immensely important to educate and enlighten the 
population on both the consequences of the problem and the plans for a solution. 
As a strategy of survival, of enlargement of membership or of building a 
stronger arrangement, the ECOWAS information strategy is probably the right strategy 
but as a part of the implementation strategy it is absolutely not complete. The 
ECOWAS Moratorium has, as many other initiatives over the last decade, been 
portrayed as an African initiative to solve an African problem. The only problem is 
that most Africans have not been told about it. The top-down approach adopted here is 
not unusual in the African context. As Clapham has stated, “(...) the imposition of 
control from the top rather than the mobilisation of support from below became the 
predominant relationship between African rulers and their subjects.”242 ECOWAS is 
known for its liking of adopting top-down strategies. NRA is a regionalist theory, 
which focuses on the multiplicity of processes involved in regionalisation. The 
processes stretch from state-led projects to individual and informal cross-borders trade. 
NRA attempts to connect the formal and the informal processes, to connect 
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regionalism from the top and regionalism from below. What I am saying here is that 
NRA is a theory, which has adopted a bottom-up profile to compliment the top-down 
approach usually adopted in traditional regionalist theory. But this insight is not 
reflected in the strategies adopted by ECOWAS concerning the implementation of the 
Moratorium. 
 
4.4.4.1. Civil Society as an Actor in West African Regionalism 
NRA focuses on the diversity of actors in regionalisation. Civil society243 is an 
important actor in this, which I also defined in first chapter as one of the transnational 
actors I would direct my focus towards in this study. There is a multiplicity of 
organisations dealing with small arms in West Africa. I will briefly mention some of 
the most important civil society organisations involved. The International Action 
Network on Small Arms (IANSA)244 is an important organisation which has been 
cooperating with Amnesty International. They have also formed a sub-organisation 
called the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA).245 Global 
Witness246 and Human Rights Watch247 are two other examples. An example of an 
NGO only focusing on African issues is Safer Africa.248 One civil society actor that 
has been quite actively involved in the Moratorium is NISAT249, which is a project 
under PRIO and is supported by the Norwegian government. The last NGO I will 
mention here is Small Arms Survey250 which is situated in Geneva and is one of the 
most comprehensive sources of information related to small arms. But NGOs are not 
the only group of civil society actors involved. The Church is one of the most 
influential civil society elements in Africa. Its position in society in general is very 
strong and different actors within the Church have been involved in solving the SALW 
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problem. We should also not forget the influence of women organisations in Africa. 
They are certainly a force to be recognised. 
Civil society organisations have not been participating much in the actual 
implementation process. They have been consulted before the signing of the different 
documents and they have also been consulted when discussing a possible restructuring 
of the Moratorium but that is about it when it comes to civil society participation. They 
are also present in the NatComs but as mentioned above, many of those NatComs 
established are suffering from weak capacity and lack of funds and political support. 
When civil society organisations have been consulted they have given an overall very 
positive critique. This raises two questions. Why has civil society not been more 
involved? And why have they been so positive of a project, which has almost no 
proven results to show so far? Many things have been said about the place and 
importance of civil society in Africa. First of all, a working civil society holds many 
functions. Among these are being a buffer or a broker between state and society, being 
representative of various interests or an agent of change. Chabal and Daloz has been 
quite critical of African civil society and have concluded that there is no functional 
civil society in Africa at all.251 The main argument of Chabal & Daloz is that the 
African society is divided vertically. Therefore there are no social networks distinct 
from the state and capable of transcending communal or religious ties. In response, 
others have pointed to the impact of civil society in the overthrowing of Daniel Arap 
Moi in Kenya and other important acts of resistance movements. Civil society in 
Africa do not hold the influence that the number of NGOs should imply but there are 
important societal forces capable of influencing society and governmental policy on 
the continent. So, the reason for the lack of a more influential civil society 
participation in the Moratorium must again, first and foremost, be ascribed to the top-
down approach, which ECOWAS has been known to adopt. 
Regarding my second question, the reason for their enthusiasm today when 
knowing the poor record of accomplishment might be explained by their initial 
enthusiasm and support and therefore their unwillingness to admit being proved 
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wrong.252 It can also be explained by a sort of realistic recognition that the Moratorium 
is not perfect but it is the best there is presently. The fact still remains that civil society 
has not taken, or has not been allowed to take, a part in the process as important as 
would be natural in a NRA approach. I am not saying that civil society is not 
concerned with the problem of SALW but it seems that they operate outside the 
institutional arrangements envisioned in the Moratorium. They are more or less 
frequently consulted but they are not properly drawn into the actual implementation 
process. One example of an area where they could give immense contributions through 
for instance awareness campaigns is the first priority area of PCASED, establishing a 
culture of peace. This is mentioned in the Plan of Action: “Member States, the 
ECOWAS Executive Secretariat (…) will seek the active collaboration of inter-
governmental organisations, UNESCO, civil society organisations, and women’s 
organisations.”253 This goal has not been fulfilled to a satisfactory level. Civil society 
campaigns would also help educate the population on both the consequences of and 
the actions taken to stop arms proliferation in West Africa. 
 
4.4.5. Distrust 
It is commonly recognised that trust among the integrating countries is a 
precondition for a regionalist project to succeed. Trust among nations inside a region is 
intimately connected to the level of regional identity. This level of regional coherence 
and regional identity is what Hettne has refers to as the pursuit of regionness.254 In this 
sense, confidence among the West African countries would be strengthened by steps 
taken to build up a stronger regional identity. Today this regional identity is severely 
hampered by for instance the divide between the Anglophone and the Francophone 
countries, not only regarding language but also culture inherited from the colonial era, 
trading, and hegemonic aspirations. As Khobe has stated: ”Healthy competition for 
development among states is what every seriously minded person desires, but deep-
rooted suspicion and rivalry between the ruling classes of the various member states 
have created a fertile ground for outside interest to undermine the elites of these 
                                                 
252 March, Nicholas (2005) 
253 The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, p.57 
254 Hettne, Bjørn (1993). This was discussed in section 2.2. 
 68
countries”.255 It would be safe to say that West Africa is today far from reaching the 
fifth and highest level of regionness defined by Hettne to be a regional institutionalised 
polity where the region is an “acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, 
legitimacy, and structure of decision-making.”256 
One measure which would address the distrust is transparency. The Code of 
Conduct tries to facilitate transparency by increasing information exchange in the area 
of arms ordering. ECOWAS is then supposed to use this information given to them by 
the member states and make an arms register as a confidence building measure.257 
Again, a noble objective but it is an objective which have proceeded at a very slow 
pace and even if ECOWAS made such an arms register it would be almost entirely in 
vein as long as everybody knows that most states do not follow the directions given in 
the Moratorium and both officially and unofficially import more weapons than are 
legitimised by the agreement and reported to ECOWAS. As long as the states are 
contradicting themselves by operating in the manner of for instance Charles Taylor or 
the government of Guinea, no confidence will ever be present among the West African 
countries. The lack of confidence is not an irrational act of paranoia. It is rather a well-
founded fear of interference in domestic politics by neighbouring states like we have 
seen in the cases of Sierra Leone and Côte d`Ivoire or in the different hegemonic acts 
of interference by Nigeria. When the government of Guinea is supplying LURD with 
weapons it is because LURD is offering possibilities for the Guinean government to 
obtain certain domestic and/or foreign policy objectives.258 For the Guinean 
government the objectives are perceived as so important that they are given preference 
over the political commitments laid down in the Moratorium. Transparency in official 
arms import will not deal with this issue of distrust as long as governments are 
importing huge amounts of weapons through illegal transnational networks. Distrust is 
a feature of the region, which severely restricts the possibilities for cooperation 
because it makes transparency and information sharing almost impossible. The UN 
Small Arms Panel has addressed this issue. 
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“Accumulation of weapons by means of illicit trafficking is facilitated by a lack of  
coordination and cooperation among the states involved. In the case of both the  
re-circulation and supply of weapons from outside the region or sub-region, efforts to  
diminish the negative effects of such weapons are hampered by states that will not  
or cannot cooperate in such basic functions as sharing information regarding illicit  
trafficking in weapons and coordinating the cross-border seizure and collection of 
weapons.”259 
 
The fact that West African countries differ in their willingness to handle the 
problem of SALW proliferation is a critical issue, whether the reasons for the lack of 
will is financial, political or ideological.260 It is also a result of the different countries 
being affected by SALW in various degrees.261 The distrust confirms their 
contradictory motives and that there is no real transparency in West African weapons 
affairs. And the respective governments know this. The lack of attention given to this 
issue by ECOWAS is then a recognition of the fact that no state is willing to publicly 
admit to the lack of transparency and address it as a problem which needs to be solved. 
The informal conduct of neo-patrimonial governments is not an issue. 
Up until now, I have not presented many successful aspects of the 
implementation process. But regarding disarmament there has actually been made 
progress. The Code of Conduct requires member states to collect and destroy surplus 
weapons. Countries such as Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Niger have all 
complied with this, at least to a certain extent262 Vines states that ten out of the 16 
member states have made progress in destroying surplus or seized illegal weapons 
since 1998.263 The destruction of anti-personnel mines is an area where significant 
work has been done and support has been given mainly by the Canadian 
government.264 Although credit should be given for the work on disarmament, it is not 
to say that the member states have reached a satisfactory level of disarmament. Many 
of the weapons used in prior armed conflicts are now used in current conflicts. And 
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distrust makes it harder for the NatComs to collect and destroy weapons. Insurgent 
groups do not feel safe enough to hand over their weapons, people feel the need to be 
armed for self defence reasons and the leaders feel the need to maintain a heavily 
armed military and security force in case of uprisings or external interference in 
domestic issues. Distrust is not only a feature of the relationship between the states. It 
is also a feature of the relationship between the rulers and their subjects, between the 
government and the opposition and also often between the regime and the army. The 
history of independent Africa has shown that the total lack of a transparent society has 
led to proliferation of distrust in all aspects of society. Taking measures towards 
building a strong regional identity would decrease the distrust and by doing that, 
increase the possibilities for a higher level of transparency, openness and confidence 
which the Moratorium presupposes. 
 
4.4.6. Motive Force 
Up until now I have mentioned the lack of political will several times. In the 
following I will relate political will to aspects inherent in the African state but also 
look at the phenomenon through the lenses of other theoretical frameworks such as 
Realism and Constructivism. 
When stating that the lack of political will is a problem, I do not mean that there 
is no political will present. What I am saying is that there is not enough political will. 
This leads me to the distinction between political interest and motive force. There is 
definitely a political interest in solving the problem of SALW in West Africa, but there 
is not enough motive force. Motive force is defined as “the compelling factors of high 
politics character that bring a process of integration forward”265 Pushing such an 
extensive process as the implementation of the Moratorium requires a stronger force 
than mere political interest. It requires the presence of motive force. The member 
states needs to see the solution to the SALW problem as a compulsion, not as an 
interest. As bystanders, we might claim the solution to be one of compelling necessity. 
But even if we are right in such a claim, the objective truth is not what matters here. 
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What decides the faith of the process is how those in involved with the Moratorium 
perceive the threat of SALW proliferation.266 
Bøås and Dokken argues that in order for Africa to achieve successful regional 
integration, they need to begin with areas where they are mutually dependant on each 
other.267 Regional security is such an area. Human security is another. The 
proliferation of SALW is definitely a threat to both. But even so, there is clearly not 
enough motive force present in the region. This illustrates the importance of 
perception. West African leaders do not, at this point in time, perceive the solution to 
the small arms problem as one of compelling necessity. Other and conflicting goals are 
being prioritised because they are perceived as more compelling by the leaders. 
It is possible though, that the political elite see the solution to the SALW 
problem as the most important goal for the country as a whole. But that does not mean 
that it will be prioritised. Being a political leader, a Head of State, concerned with 
what is best for his country is only one of the identities held by a West African leader. 
The conflicting goals are often connected to other identities, such as the identity of a 
business man, of a caretaker for his local community or the identity of being the leader 
of a regime threatened by insurgents or rebels. 
The importance of perception and different identities can be linked up to so-
called “constructivism”. A constructivist approach to the problem of motive force 
would highlight that it is the collective identity and meaning which will constitute the 
structure organising our actions. And the structure holds no logic by itself. The logic is 
created by the states and other actors. States, as humans, holds a certain number of 
identities.268 These identities are applied in different circumstances. And it is these 
identities that lead and control their actions.269 West African leaders have several roles 
to play in their society. They are statesmen, businessmen and they are also on top of a 
complex network of patron-client relationships usually involving their entire local 
community and/or region. This situation is a result of the neo-patrimonial way in 
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268 States can be seen as the unit of analysis in Constructivism even though constructivists often use other actors 
than states as their unit of analysis. The main difference between Realism and Constructivism is not the choice of 
unit of analysis but rather that constructivism sees the actors and the structure as mutually constituting. 
269 Wendt, Alexander (1994 &1999) 
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which the states are run. State affairs have become personalised. When West African 
political leaders do not perceive the solution to the SALW problem as one of 
compulsion, it is because their socially constructed context tells them that it is not as 
important as other goals. And these goals are often related to regime security. That 
leads me over to Realism. In a realist school of thought this lack of political will to 
cooperate in regional schemes, especially when it involves surrendering any kind of 
sovereignty, can be explained by their role as “defensive positionalists” meaning that 
their ultimate goal is not the maximum amount of welfare but rather to protect their 
regime and their position in the West African international community. 
What I have tried to illustrate here is that neither the realist, the constructivist 
nor the neo-patrimonial explanation are absolute truths, but it is possible to make 
plausible arguments out of them when using these different theoretical lenses.  The 
fact is that there is no motive force present to push the process forward as fast as 
would be desirable. But how we explain that fact will depend on which theoretical 
lenses we are using. 
 
4.5. Is NRA Sufficient? 
Is seems clear that the implementation of the Moratorium does not reflect the 
insight of NRA to a satisfactory level. But there are also important aspects of the 
implementation process not possible to view through the theoretical lenses of NRA. 
 
4.5.1. Institutional Arrangements 
In earlier theories of regionalism the institutions were given a lot of attention. 
Even though NRA is a theory that attempts to connect the formal and the informal 
parts of regionalism and regionalisation it do not offer a proper approach to analysing 
the institutional arrangements of West African regionalism. Any regionalist project 
needs well-functioning institutional arrangements with the proper organisation, 
resources and capacities. 
At the top of the Moratorium institutionally we find the ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary and his Executive Secretariat. The Executive Secretary and his secretariat 
are in charge of over-viewing the day to day implementation of the Moratorium. The 
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Code of Conduct states that the structures, staff and procedures shall be placed within 
the Secretariat in order to assist member states. The Secretariat shall also establish four 
Zonal Observation Bureaus. They will monitor compliance and report progress to the 
Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State. The Executive Secretary is also given the 
responsibility of obtaining external funding and technical assistance to support 
activities related to the Moratorium. 270 At the national level, the NatComs are 
supposed to be responsible for the implementation. Already from the outset, 
ECOWAS realised that neither they, nor the member states had the capacity needed to 
implement the Moratorium and that made the way for the temporary establishment of 
PCASED. 
The Executive Secretariat has not fulfilled its responsibilities regarding the 
Moratorium. But some progress has been made. The planned four Zonal Observation 
Bureaus have been established for information gathering and for monitoring 
compliance. ECOWAS also appointed a new Deputy Executive Secretary for Political 
Affairs, Defence and Security (DES/PADS) responsible for conflict management and 
implementation of the Moratorium. In 2004 the ECOWAS Council of Ministers also 
authorised the creation of a small arms unit. This unit is supposed to be placed within 
the Executive Secretariat and work on improving coordination with the NatComs.271 
But all initiatives from ECOWAS have been more or less hampered by their limited 
capacity, economically, technically and institutionally. There is no doubt about the fact 
that they do have limited resources but this might also be an easy excuse when they 
receive criticism for, for instance, not supporting the NatComs as much as they should 
have done. But lack of capacity is a real problem. It is possible to make plausible 
arguments of ECOWAS being a too poorly organised institution not capable of 
implementing such an agreement. Due to the huge work load, the Executive Secretary 
has delegated the responsibility for implementation to the DES/PADS. But the 
DES/PADS is only one man with no secretariat of his own. Even though the Executive 
Secretariat is involved they do not have the capacity to master this task. The small 
arms unit might help, so might ECOSAP do, but still it seems overambitious to 
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presume that this will be enough. Institutional capacity is a severe limitation for the 
successful implementation of the Moratorium. 
The establishment of, and the work within the NatComs have, as mentioned, 
proceeded at a very slow pace. This can mainly be ascribed to the lack of political will 
and rivalries between the government and departments inside each and every member 
state. 272 This has also clearly influenced the work of both the ECOWAS Secretariat 
and PCASED. But despite all this, there are some member states that have managed to 
establish functioning NatComs. Another problem of the NatComs is poorly trained 
personnel. Finding qualified personnel at a permanent basis have not been easy. 
During its five years in operation, PCASED had a mixed record of success. The 
main problem may have been that the nine priority areas were just too ambitious. For 
instance looking at the first, establishing a culture of peace. PCASED was established 
for a period of five years and with that in mind, establishing a culture of peace in West 
Africa seems quite ambitious, if not to say overambitious. This goal includes huge 
tasks and aspects, such as DDRR-projects (Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration) in the war torn countries, public awareness, political 
will and continental cooperation, which will demand much more time, effort and 
capacity than was ever possible within the framework of PCASED.  
 
4.5.1.1. Cooperation With and Within UN 
Another problem of PCASED is related to the fact that it is an arrangement 
under UN control. Initially, PCASED was under the operational control of the United 
Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC). But when 
PCASED expanded, it was transferred to UNDP. UNDP was then responsible for 
providing advisory and financial support for the operations of PCASED. This transfer 
was not the result of a unanimous agreement. There were clear frictions between 
UNREC and UNDP over who should be in control over PCASED.273 And this friction 
was as much a personal issue between individuals in those two UN organisations as an 
organisational issue. UNDP has also been criticised for its unwillingness to cooperate 
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with other UN arrangements such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in West 
Africa. The relationship between UNDP and the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit has been 
somewhat problematic and has demanded negotiations. Poor coordination between 
different UN missions has also slowed disarmament down because ex-combatants in 
Côte d’Ivoire have received much more compensation for handing in their weapons 
than those in Liberia. The knowledge of this has made disarmament in Liberia 
proceeding at a slower pace.274  
 
4.5.2. Financing the Implementation 
The estimated cost for the implementation programme was US$ 13 million over 
a five year period from 1999 to 2004.275 Considering that the total ECOWAS budget of 
2001 was US$ 10.3 million, it is easy to see that ECOWAS do not have the means to 
fulfil the task of financing the Moratorium on its own. They are completely reliant 
upon donors. They have received financial support. But all the contributions in total 
“only” amount to little over US$ 5 million.276 The gap is US$ 8 million. ECOWAS is 
not capable of filling that gap. Another problem regarding financing is that some 
countries have attached conditionalities to their contributions while others have not. 
This creates difficulties for ECOWAS in administering the implementation. Some 
might say that the money is there as long as there is genuine interest and political will 
to solve the problem. But the West African states are among the poorest of the poor. In 
2003, only three countries in the region had a GNI per capita above US$ 500 (Cape 
Verde, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal) while seven were below US$ 300. In absolute 
figures the total GNI of West Africa was 50% of the Norwegian GNI.277 West Africa 
has a population of 250 million people. Norway has 4.5 million. There is a crucially 
limited amount of funding available in the region. Because the countries are in this 
financial situation they are not transferring the agreed amounts to ECOWAS and the 
organisation is therefore not able to accomplish its goals. I am not saying that the West 
African states are totally incapable of giving ECOWAS more funding because political 
                                                 
274 Vines, Alex (2005) 
275 Ogunbanwo, Sola (2002) 
276 ibid. 
277 World Bank statistics  
 76
will is of course a factor here but I am saying that they are extremely poor countries 
which will not be able to finance the whole project without help. 
The sixth priority area of the Plan of Action is to facilitate dialogue with 
producers and suppliers. The issue of promoting the Moratorium and attracting 
partners/donors is also given a lot of attention in the Code of Conduct. This is an 
important but problematic area for the West African countries. The reason being that 
West African countries feel they have to be careful not to aggravate possible donors in 
such a dialogue. Aid is a political instrument used by the Western World and there is 
no secret that states which have made themselves unpopular among the Western states 
will experience cuts in aid given to them. States that have been more receptive to 
advice from the great powers and the IFIs, such as for instance Uganda, have 
experienced easier access to aid. Considering the importance of donor contribution, 
which is immense both regarding the Moratorium, ECOWAS and the general survival 
of many West Africa states, it is understandable that West African governments and 
ECOWAS officials want to step carefully when handling this matter. The Moratorium, 
for one, would die an instant death if the donors backed out. In this situation of 
negotiations, the position of ECOWAS and the position of the Western backers are not 
at all level. This is not a new situation in negotiations between African and Western 
states. As Clapham stated about the Lomè II, it “essentially consisted in the EC telling 
the ACP states how much aid they were going to get, and the ACP complaining that it 
was not enough.”278 The result of the negotiations on financing the project would 
probably be more fruitful if the negotiations were conducted on equal terms. Not only 
more fruitful for ECOWAS but for those giving financial support as well. 
NRA is a regionalist theory mainly built on regionalism in developing 
countries. In developing countries, finances will always be an issue. There will be a 
situation where donors come into the process and they will often bring with them their 
own ideas and conditionalities. Then, the dependency on donors and external partners 
will affect the process in a matter which NRA not necessarily gives us the tools for 
analysing, especially because NRA, as a regionalist theory, direct its main focus 
towards informal regionalism instead of connecting the formal and the informal. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis I have addressed my attention towards the implementation of the 
ECOWAS small arms Moratorium. I started by defining my research question to be: 
 “To what extent do the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons, its implementation documents and its 
actual implementation, reflect  the central aspects of New Regionalism such as 
Transnationalism and Neo-patrimonialism in the West African region?” 
In short, the analysis has shown that the implementation documents and the 
actual process of implementation only to a quite limited extent reflect the central 
aspects of NRA. My finding is that there are only two areas of the implementation 
process which reflects these central aspects. But there are several examples of the 
opposite. As mentioned earlier, NRA is not the recipe for a successful African regional 
project such as the Moratorium. But with that said, it is important that the Moratorium 
reflects the most central insights brought forward by NRA, such as Transnationalism, 
Neo-patrimonialism and other aspects inherent both in NRA and in the African state. It 
is important because these aspects reflect the West African reality. My conclusion is 
that the implementation of the Moratorium does not take these insights sufficiently 
into account. The informal processes and the patrimonial way in which the state 
operates are far from given the appropriate amount of attention. The reason for this is 
most probably that many of the same persons who are responsible for implementing 
the Moratorium at the national level have interests in the informal sphere concerning 
arms dealings and in the private sphere concerning business and/or kinship. The 
transnational processes are born out of a lack of institutionalisation of the state and the 
still growing tendency of privatisation and personalisation of the public sphere.279 This 
is of course a central aspect of Neo-patrimonialism and it is not given the proper 
attention by either ECOWAS or the national governments concerning the 
implementation of the Moratorium. But the West African states are not the only 
responsible party. Western states also need to take a greater responsibility for their 
involvement in the arms transfers if the Moratorium is going to be successful. 
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5.1. Theoretical Remarks 
As stated earlier, NRA is the dominant theoretical approach today for studying 
regionalism, especially in Africa. But it is not a totally complete theory of regionalism. 
NRA attempts to connect the formal and the informal processes. It wants to look 
beyond state-centrism and focus on other actors as well as the states. The focus on the 
informal part of regionalism to a certain degree overshadows the formal part. It is 
certainly important to take the informal processes into account and recognise their 
importance in a region that is regionalising but we must not forget the state-led 
processes when trying to compliment them with the informal ones. For instance, as my 
research has shown, the theoretical tools given by NRA for reviewing important 
aspects of a regionalist project such as institutional arrangements, administrative 
mechanisms and financial matters are very limited. These aspects are not the result of 
informal processes. They must be confronted at the formal level. The traditional 
integration theories have been widely criticised for not giving enough attention to the 
informal processes. NRA might give too much attention to the informal part of 
regionalism on the cost of formal regionalism. 
 
5.2. Methodological Remarks 
The most apparent methodological weakness of my study is that I have 
exclusively used secondary literature. This problem is connected to the reliability. But 
as I argued in chapter one, the decision of relying on secondary literature was made 
after careful considerations. I also hoped to increase the reliability by using multiple 
sources. The possibility for doing fieldwork was from the outset considered not to be a 
realistic possibility for me given the anticipated results of such fieldwork, the political 
situation in West Africa and the general limitations of this study, both concerning 
finances and time span.  
Generalisation was another issue I raised. As I stated, it was not my goal to find 
any grounds for empirical generalisation but I hoped to find grounds for theoretical 
generalisation. As I see it, I did that by concluding above that NRA has limitations 
when using the NRA framework to evaluate such a regionalist project. This may be 
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seen as a contribution to the further development of NRA as a theory of regionalism 
and would therefore be of scientific value beyond this single empirical case.  
Even though it was not the goal of this study to find any grounds for empirical 
generalisation, my investigation has made me aware of the possibility of such after all. 
And it is linked to the question of what effects the success or failure of the ECOWAS 
Moratorium will have on other small arms initiatives such as the East African 
Initiative (The Nairobi Protocol280) or the Bamako Declaration of the AU.281 These 
initiatives were not only partly inspired by the ECOWAS Moratorium but they were 
also modelled after it. What will the likely failure of the Moratorium then mean for 
them? In my opinion such a failure will clearly affect other African small arms 
initiatives in a negative fashion. When the Moratorium was first presented it was met 
with great optimism. It created a kind of “look to West Africa”-attitude not only in 
other African regions but also in the wider international community. The expectations 
were huge but they have not been fulfilled. This will affect other initiatives for 
instance in the way that it will be harder to attract foreign support, both financially and 
technically. One should also not underestimate the possibility for psychological effects 
on other initiatives by the possible failure of the Moratorium. It was not the aim of this 
study to investigate the general success or failure of the Moratorium and certainly not 
to find the general answer to the problem of SALW in Africa. But I still see it as 
important to raise this question of consequences of a failed Moratorium if for no other 
reason as to attract attention to the fact that the ECOWAS Moratorium might be 
significantly influential for other regions than West Africa. 
Concerning validity, which I also brought up in the introduction, I have tried to 
direct attention to different aspects of the arms trade, of the West African society and 
state, and of NRA. Together this has proven the fact that the reflection of NRA in the 
implementation process is necessary for the Moratorium to be a success because the 
central aspects of NRA reflect the West African reality.  
                                                 
280 The Nairobi Protocol on small arms and light weapons was signed by eleven East African states on 21 April 
2004.  The full text of the Protocol is available at http://www.saferafrica.org/DocumentsCentre/NAIROBI-
Protocol.asp 
281  The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons was signed by all AU members on 30 November 2000. The full 
Declaration text is available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/6691.htm 
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Another issue brought up in chapter one was the challenge of catching all the 
dimensions in order to see the whole picture. Of course there are so many interests and 
processes involved in West African regionalism that describing the complete picture is 
not feasible under the limitations of this study. But I have tried to bring up the most 
important ones. What I also have tried to avoid is going into any comprehensive 
discussions about the underlying motives and political goals of the different actors. 
Instead I have merely limited myself to focus on the actual actions instead of trying to 
thoroughly explain or speculate into all aspects of the motives for these actions. 
 
5.3. Convention or No Convention: Is That the Question? 
At the end of this study I wish to say something about the future of the 
Moratorium. First of all, I see it as necessary to question whether a regional approach 
really is the best way of approaching this problem. As this study shows, many of the 
issues are extra-regional. Although West African states clearly must take their fair 
share of responsibility for the problem, one could make plausible arguments for the 
problem being introduced from outside the region. Then the solution also must come 
partly from outside. If a regional political approach is not the most fruitful, what is? 
ECOWAS has argued for a regional convention. In line with what they decided last 
summer, the future probably lies within the framework of a convention.  
Ogunbanwo has argued that ECOWAS have two options for influencing the 
implementation process. These two options are to work harder for the establishment of 
well-functioning NatComs and a thorough application of the Code of Conduct. And if 
member states do not comply with the Code of Conduct they must be put under 
pressure to act differently.282 These opportunities might be too weak and insufficient. 
All the problems regarding implementation of the Moratorium and the poor record of 
compliance have led many to urge and support ECOWAS in making the Moratorium 
into a convention. Among them are Kofi Annan283 and the EU.284 As long as the 
document is not legally binding, the only possible form of “punishment” for non-
compliance is “blaming and shaming”, which obviously do not work, at least not when 
                                                 
282 Ogunbanwo, Sola (2002) 
283 United Nations Press Release, 15 February 2005 
284 European Union Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP of 2 December 2004 
 81
every single member state have been in violation of the commitments imbedded in the 
Moratorium. When ECOWAS prolonged the life of the Moratorium in October 2004 
they also decided that it will be made into a convention and the hope is that an 
agreement will be reached before December 2005.285 A working draft is circulated to 
member states, donors and civil society. But as of August 2005 nothing has been 
completed. There are several issues that need to be confronted for this possible 
convention to be effective. For one thing, a discussion on sanctions is necessary. 
Having a convention without the appropriate sanctions is, as history has shown, futile. 
One possibility is economic sanctions, another is political sanctions for non-
compliance. But before any of this will be a reality, the first step is to reach an 
agreement and this being signed by the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State. The 
next step is ratification and implementation into national legislation. Without being too 
pessimistic, I would say that to accomplish this is going to be extremely difficult, 
considering the track record of African states regarding ratification and 
implementation of treaties which entails the transfer of sovereignty or control to a 
supranational body. Since independence, most African states have watched over their 
sovereignty as hawks. For instance, the attempts made by ECOWAS to create a West 
African Parliament have been futile. My fear is that the small arms convention will 
suffer the same destiny. There may be many reasons for this. One reason might be the 
fear among the states due to uneven power and the fear of relative shifts in the power 
balance between them. This explanation would be in line with Realism although the 
West African states cannot be ascribed with the characteristics of a rational uniform 
actor with specific national interests. Another reason might be reluctance by the rulers 
to give up their highly personalised power in the neo-patrimonial state. As I said, there 
might be many reasons and these are only two plausible and not incompatible 
arguments. But I do not believe that a convention is the ultimate answer to the problem 
because all in all it comes down to the question of political will. Without real political 
will, there will be no convention. Without any real political will, nobody will respect 
the Moratorium. Without any real political will, the problem of small arms 
proliferation will not be solved. And therefore, the issue of political will is a more 
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important question than whether or not a convention will bring the process of ending 
arms proliferation in West Africa further than it has been brought by the Moratorium. 
Without any real political will, no solution to the SALW problem will become reality, 
regardless of the existence of a convention. I am not saying that the signing of a 
convention would be futile. It would certainly be an admirable and important step in 
the right direction. My point is that first of all, the ratification of such a convention 
depends on political will and that even if it will be signed it is not going to be “The 
Final Solution” some have portrayed it to be. 
As mentioned above, both the UN and the EU have argued strongly for making 
the Moratorium into a convention. But why is there no talk of making the Wassenaar 
Arrangement into a convention? Why should not the supply side be governed by an 
international convention along with the demand side? Why should there not be a 
global convention on SALW trade? The main argument for making the Moratorium 
into a convention is non-compliance from member states. Non-compliance to the 
Wassenaar Arrangement’s non-binding recommendations is currently resulting in 
millions worth of small arms being sold to West Africa by member states of 
Wassenaar. As we can see, it is the same problem of non-compliance on both sides of 
the table in arms trade and therefore the same measures should be taken on both sides. 
In other words, it will be a better solution to create a global convention instead of a 
regional convention. As long as many of the issues are extra-regional, the solution 
needs to address these and that can obviously not be done within the framework of a 
regional arrangement. The governments of West Africa clearly need to recognise the 
commitment they have made by signing the Moratorium but so must Western 
governments do regarding their involvement in these actions. I am not saying that a 
regional arrangement in West Africa is futile but it should not be regarded as the 
“Final Solution”. It is needed as a complimentary and supplementary arrangement 
because, as this study shows, the West African region has its characteristics that need 
to be taken into account. But the main arrangement should be at the global level. 
Western countries have too often been too reluctant in taking any real responsibility 
for their own involvement in the arms trade and have seen this mainly as an African 
problem, not as an international problem. This needs to change. 
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